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Abstract
This thesis employs Carl von Clausewitz’s theory on moral forces to
conduct an analysis of World War II’s 1944-1945 Ardennes Offensive. The
literature largely focuses on presenting the physical components of the
offensive, neglecting the moral. This thesis aims to fill this gap by
presenting an analysis of the utilisation and effects of both physical and
moral forces in the Ardennes Offensive and determining the importance of
each to the outcome. Analysing the planning and execution of the offensive
through this theoretical perspective reveals that moral forces played a
significant part in Allied success in the Ardennes. The analysis exposed the
German reliance on physical superiority yet failure to adjust initial plans to
the geographical conditions in the area, in part due to Adolf Hitler’s total
control of the armed forces. Following the offensive’s commencement,
Allied military leadership demonstrated intuitive thought, good judgment,
and determination resulting in swift defense of the area. German Forces
were unable to break through this defense despite their great physical
advantage. The analysis suggests that Allied moral forces greatly
contributed to this initial defense, utilising psychological strength until the
physical forces were able to be brought up to equal strength. As a reinterpretation of the Ardennes Offensive, this thesis contributes to the
historical studies on battles of World War II and demonstrates the
importance of moral forces in warfare.
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Introduction
The Ardennes Offensive, more commonly known as ‘The Battle of the
Bulge’ was the last major German offensive of World War II and took place
in the Ardennes region of Belgium, Luxembourg, and France between 16
December, 1944 and January 25, 1945. On December 16, German Forces
totalling approximately 250,000 began the attack against a mere 68,822
United States Forces who were resting and refitting in the region (Cole,
1965). There were multiple objectives to the offensive; firstly, the key
objective was to capture the port of Antwerp, north of the Ardennes, which
was currently occupied by the Allies (Whiting, 1985, p. 23). Secondly, in
doing so, the Germany Army was to split the British Forces in the north
from United States Forces in the south and create disruption within the
Allied High Command (Cole, 1965, p. 17). Lastly, it was expected that the
culmination of these objectives would force the Western Allies to sign a
separate peace treaty from the Soviets which would allow Germany to focus
solely on the war in the east (Cirillo, 2003, p. 5; Cooke & Evans, 2008, p. 9;
Ethier, 2009, p. 38; Whiting, 1985, p. 22). By this stage of the war, the
physical components were not the only determining factor of successful
offensive and defensive actions, the psychological strength of an army’s
troops pushed them farther than imaginable.
This thesis will employ Carl von Clausewitz’s theory on moral forces,
as outlined in his text On War (1993), originally published in 1832, in its
analysis of the Ardennes Offensive. Clausewitz’s perspective states that it is
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the interaction between physical and moral forces that determines the victor
in warfare (Clausewitz cited in Howard, 2002, p. 27). Physical forces are
those that are more commonly linked to warfare and include the armed
forces, their composition and armament (Clausewitz, 1993, p. 157). A study
of the literature reveals that most examinations of the offensive focus purely
on the physical forces, yet Clausewitz’s perspective perceives this as
incomplete

as

all

warfare

involves

psychological

forces.

These

psychological forces Clausewitz terms ‘moral forces’ and include courage,
morale, and the skill of the commander (Clausewitz, p. 96, 221; Howard,
2002, p. 25; Wallach, 1986, p. 5). This thesis will employ the perspective
that physical and moral forces intertwine to produce the final result,
therefore an army is more likely to be the victor in warfare if they marshal
both physical and moral forces.

The aim of the research is to analyse how Allied and German Forces
utilised their physical and moral forces and to determine the effects in doing
so. The physical forces will form the foundation due to their measurability
which will be followed by a deeper analysis of the moral forces. This will
include analysing the individual and group sources of the adversaries moral
forces as these effect the output of both forces as “war is a trial of moral and
physical forces by means of the latter” (Clausewitz cited in Howard, 2002,
p. 27). The Ardennes Offensive is an ideal battle to analyse through this
perspective as the German Army held a vast physical superiority in the
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offensive’s initial stage, yet failed to capitalise on this advantage to produce
success.

As the last major German offensive of the war, and the United States
largest land battle of World War II, the Ardennes Offensive is frequently
examined in the literature (Cole, 1965; Forty, 2000; Goolrick & Tanner,
1979; MacDonald, 1993). Despite this, historians continue to focus
primarily on physical aspects, suggesting that physical forces were the
single influence on the final result (Blanchette, 1998; Cole, 1965; Dupuy et
al., 1994; Forty, 2000). While many authors briefly mention moral forces
(Ambrose, 2001; Blumenson, 1985), the failure to provide a deeper analysis
reveals that there is no comprehensive study of the offensive which then
limits our understanding of the offensive, and consequently warfare itself, to
a battle defined solely by physical aspects. This gap within the literature can
be filled by an analysis employing Clausewitz’s perspective on moral forces
that has not previously been applied to the Ardennes Offensive. In doing so,
this thesis aims to answer the following research questions:
1. Using Clausewitzian theory, what does an analysis of World War
II’s 1944-1945 Ardennes Offensive reveal about the utilisation and
effects of physical and moral forces?
2. To what degree was the Ardennes Offensive determined through
physical or moral forces?
3. What were the main events, operations or situations that effected
moral forces in the Ardennes Offensive?
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This thesis employs historiography to conduct the historical analysis
and provide a re-interpretation of the Ardennes Offensive. Historiography is
the most appropriate methodology as it allows for the discovery of the
various interpretations of the offensive through the study of primary and
secondary sources, most notably official histories, memoirs and interviews
(Berg, 2001; Lundy, 2008). By analysing the various interpretations
presented in the literature, this thesis will produce a re-interpretation of the
Ardennes Offensive through the perspective of Clausewitzian theory by
applying a connection between the theoretical concepts outlined by
Clausewitz to the offensive to provide an explanation for Allied success in
the Ardennes.
This thesis is structured according to subjects to allow for a clear and
organised analysis. Beginning with Chapter One, the thesis will outline the
theoretical perspective, review the literature and describe the methodology.
Chapter Two examines the events and decisions leading up to the Ardennes
Offensive to provide perspective on its significance to both Germany and
the Allies. This chapter will also provide background to the planning of the
offensive whilst introducing the German and Allied leaders involved.
Chapter Three begins the analysis of the physical forces to establish how the
adversaries utilised these forces and conclude the effectiveness of the
manner in which they were employed according to Clausewitz’s theory.
Chapter Four explores the moral forces involved; this analysis progresses
from the discussion of physical forces in Chapter Three and explores further
by focusing on specific events occurring within the offensive, notably the
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Siege of Bastogne. Lastly, Chapter Five investigates military leadership in
the Ardennes, discussing the influence of both German and Allied leaders
on the utilisation of physical and moral forces and the result of decisions
and actions made throughout the planning and execution on Allied success
and German failure. The analysis of physical and moral forces in the
Ardennes Offensive offers a unique perspective that contributes to the study
of the psychological and emotional influence on warfare.
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Chapter One
Theory
Carl von Clausewitz (1780 – 1831) is a well-known military theorist
whose text, On War (1993), originally published in 1832, is considered by
many historians to be the most significant text on warfare (Louise Wilmott
cited in Clausewitz, 1997, p. ix). Clausewitz’s theory of warfare
encompasses almost all aspects relating to the operation, ranging from the
relationship between attack and defense, political and military objectives,
and the tactics of combat. On War, and its precursor, Principles of War
(2003), originally published in 1832, were developed during his experiences
in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars; it was through these experiences
that Clausewitz became observant to the human dimension of warfare
(Howard, 2002, p. 5). This human dimension, or emotionally based element,
became what is known as ‘moral forces’ - forces that are unquantifiable for
instance courage and morale, but have a great effect on the execution of war
on all levels. Clausewitz’s perspective is that moral forces are just as
important as ‘physical forces’ - forces that are more commonly associated
with warfare as they include weapons, equipment, and troop numbers
(Handel M. I., 2001, pp. 83, 106; Kleemeier, 2007). It is through this
theoretical perspective in which the analysis of World War II’s Ardennes
Offensive will take place.
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Clausewitz’s (1993; 2003) notion of physical forces consists of three
elements: the size of the armed forces, their composition and their armament
(1993, p. 157). Unlike moral forces, physical forces have the ability to be
quantified and thus make it easier to determine a connection to the outcome
of an offensive. Clausewitz’s principles on the application of physical forces
include utilising a maximum use of force by employing surprise and speed,
and having superiority in terms of numbers. Clausewitz states that with
physical forces being equal between opponents the determining factor in
war would be the moral forces (Howard, 2002, p. 30). Thus, it is the
interaction between physical and moral forces that determine the victor as
“war is a trial of moral and physical forces by means of the latter”
(Clausewitz cited in Howard, 2002, p. 27). Michael Handel author of the
classic text, Masters of War (2001), expresses Clausewitz’s perspective of
the relationship between the forces in his article, Who Is Afraid Of Carl von
Clausewitz. A Guide To The Perplexed (1997):

In

addition

to

mobilizing

and

using

all

possible

physical/material force, the opponents simultaneously marshall
all of the moral and spiritual forces available (e.g., motivation,
dedication, and spirit of sacrifice). When one side has reached
the limits of its material strength, it can always add to its
military efforts by mobilizing all possible moral strength. Moral
forces thus act as a force multiplier… (p. 7)
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The Ardennes Offensive is an ideal battle to analyse due to the large
physical superiority initially held by the German Army.

Moral forces are those that underline all aspects of war and are
endless; those that Clausewitz discusses include courage, morale, and the
skill of the commander. According to Clausewitz, everything in war is
uncertain due to the influence of these moral forces; thus “all military action
is intertwined with psychological forces and effects” (Clausewitz cited in
Howard, 2002, p. 25). It is this notion that has formed the lens through
which the analysis of the Ardennes Offensive has taken place to reveal how
moral forces were utilised and the effects of this; which is then used to
determine the influence on the troops and consequently their utilisation of
physical forces. It is important to note the weakness of the theory which lies
in the inability to provide quantifiable standards by which to measure moral
forces; regardless the utilisation and effects can be discussed in detail. The
three forces that will be analysed are courage, morale and military
leadership. Courage: “the highest of all moral qualities in times of danger”
(Clausewitz, 1993, p. 96), assists troops in fighting through constant danger
and fear and is a result of either habit or positive motivations (p. 97, 158).
Morale is the spirit or mood of the individual soldier or the mass; high
morale is a result of frequent success or the use of maximum effort but will
also depend on why each soldier fought (Clausewitz, 1993, p. 221; Wallach,
1986, p. 5). It is a commander’s responsibility to understand the morale of
his troops which leads into the final factor of military leadership. The ideal
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military leader has a number of balanced characteristics, that of skilled
judgement, a sense of intuition, courage, and determination (Clausewitz,
1993, p. 96). The assessment on the quality of these forces will occur by
evidence of the General’s adaptability according to actual conditions,
displays of fortitude in the face of danger, understanding of their troops
moral forces, and by evidence of following their intuitive thoughts.
Evidently, moral forces often intertwine and affect not only each other, but
also the utilisation of physical forces. Therefore, an army has a greater
chance of success if they mobilise both physical and moral strength.

Literature Review
Clausewitzian Theory

Carl von Clausewitz’s theory deviates from the theoretical writings of
nineteenth century military theorists due, not merely to his argument on the
importance of moral forces, but to the simple fact that he includes these
forces in his argument at all. The literature notices this omission, yet it
continues to be unknown as to why his contemporaries, including AntoineHenri Jomini, known for his work The Art of War (2006), fail to mention
this human or emotional element. Gat (2001, p. 125) and Martel (2011)
believe military theorists omit moral forces due to a dismissal as irrelevant
or an inability to quantify these forces unlike physical forces. Michael
Handel’s text, Masters of War (2001), is considered a classic text on the
study of military theory and his examination of various military theories
concludes that this gap is due to the explanations mentioned by Gat and
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Martel, however he adds that physical forces are the most recognised
element of warfare, thus naturally they become the focus of developing
theories (p. 82). Clausewitz himself expected this, writing before his death
that as moral forces are unquantifiable they are often dismissed (1993, p.
216). He goes on to state that any theory that disregards this element is
incomplete as all “warfare has psychological effects” (p. 217).
Just as military theorists tend to ignore moral forces in warfare, so
does the literature examining Clausewitz’s theory ignore, or note very
briefly, his argument on moral forces as detailed in On War (1993) and
Principles of War (2003). Clausewitz’s well known statement that “war is a
mere continuation of policy by other means” largely dominates the focus of
the literature (Paret, 1992; Roxborough, 1994; Waldman, 2010). However,
the examination of moral forces has developed in recent years with authors
such as Drohan (2006), Gibbs (1975) and Kleemeier (2007) publishing
works which examine moral forces in detail. The development of literature
on Clausewitz’s theory of moral forces appears to coincide with the public’s
recent interest in the psychological effects of warfare and thus could
potentially begin the academic body of work on the concept.
Ulrike Kleemeier’s, “Moral Forces in War” (2007) is among the
leading contributions on moral forces in the literature as he expands on the
discussion as outlined by Clausewitz in On War (1993). Kleemeier provides
an extension to the work by breaking down the individual elements of moral
forces and is the most comprehensive study found within the literature.
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However, he sees one major weakness to Clausewitz’s framework of moral
forces, that of obedience. Kleemeier challenges Clausewitz’s perception of a
soldier being largely independent as he states that this can create chaos and
issues with leadership (p. 119). Adding obedience to the arrangement of
forces, he asserts, will assist in combatting these issues. Brian Drohan
(2006) completes a similar discussion in his work, Carl von Clausewitz, His
Trinity, and the 1812 Russian Campaign, however his discussion appears to
simply reiterate Clausewitz’s writings due to a similar but slightly different
military direction than that of moral forces. Even so, Drohan’s work
provides the connection of moral forces to additional elements of
Clausewitz’s overarching theory. Baldwin’s (1981) work is similar, whilst
not applying moral forces specifically, he discusses the influence of
Clausewitz on Nazi Germany. Where the literature lacks further insight is
through application of the theory of moral forces to actual warfare. This
thesis attempts to fill this gap by analysing a modern offensive through a
nineteenth century military theory to provide a re-interpretation of the event.
Similar to Kleemeier (2007), Clausewitz scholar, Peter Paret (1985;
1992) perceives limitations to Clausewitz’s approach. Paret believes
Clausewitz’s approach in employing men like Napoleon as examples to his
theory are unsatisfactory for practical application as he states the average
soldier will not meet these standards (1992, p. 113). Nonetheless, this
alleged ‘one-sidedness’ does not diminish the importance of moral forces as
a whole. Jehuda L. Wallach (1986) approaches the theory in a different
manner, stating the theory was never meant to be set rules but a guide. This
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stance is more accurate as all soldiers have psychological differences and
this is acknowledged by Clausewitz. Thus, no matter the example he utilised
in his writings, the application would differ, making Paret’s argument
irrelevant. Clausewitz utilised Napoleon as an example as he was involved
in the Napoleonic War and was privy to these experiences and information
that a study of historical warfare could not provide. Wallach believes that
the knowledge presented by Clausewitz is beneficial as it stresses the need
for commander’s to understand the importance of moral forces in warfare
(p. 5). In The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation (1986), Wallach very
briefly discusses Clausewitz’s theory in relation to World War II and on the
Ardennes Offensive in Chapter 19 of Book Three (p. 296-300). However,
there remains no analysis of both the physical and moral forces in the
Ardennes Offensive.
The Ardennes Offensive

The Ardennes Offensive was the largest land battle fought by United
States Forces in World War II involving over half a million troops.
Consequently it is heavily examined in the literature (Blanchette, 1998;
Cole, 1965; MacDonald, 1984; Toland, 1999). These examinations began
immediately following the offensive’s conclusion to the present day. The
Ardennes Offensive commenced with very different physical forces in terms
of size, composition and armament (Cole, 1965). Given this disproportion of
physical forces, it is surprising that the state of moral forces has been
neglected in the literature. Instead, the majority of the literature has focused
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on providing a detailed examination of the offensive, with no theoretical
foundation for analysis. A re-interpretation of the offensive employing
Clausewitz’s theory of moral forces may fill the gap in our understanding of
the offensive’s outcome and provide an alternative explanation for Allied
success in the Ardennes.
Hugh M. Cole’s, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge (1965), was
published in 1965 as one part of the U.S. Army’s official history of World
War II. This text is considered by scholars as the most significant work on
the Ardennes Offensive and is often used as the foundation for further
research (Blanchette, 1998; Dupuy, Bongard, & Anderson Jr., 1994). Each
author’s extensive research supports the accuracy of Cole’s study, proving
the methodology and production of results as appropriate. The literature on
the physical forces in the Ardennes is vast, providing detailed information to
be analysed. In contrast, information on moral forces in the literature is
mentioned, yet most fail to investigate further.
Hal C. Pattison (cited in Cole, 1993, p. vii) states that before the
offensive began the American soldier was “buoyed with success” with
Whiting (1985, pp. 4, 33) adding that they were ‘relaxed’ and ‘tolerant’ with
commanders confident as most were expecting the war to be over by
Christmas. Historians including Forty (2000) connect this state of morale to
the almost constant victory in offensive movements since the United States
Army had landed on the continent (p. 83). Consequently, the Ardennes
region of Belgium, Luxembourg, and France was a resting and refitting
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ground for U.S. troops (Blanchette, 1998). Whiting describes the Ardennes
in September, 1944:
...the Ghost Front [Ardennes region] had settled into a kind of
limbo, a haven of peace in the midst of war. Here the artillery
fired mainly for the sake of registration, and patrols probed the
enemy lines on the other side of the twin rivers only to keep in
practice. (1985, p. 39)
The presentation of the United States contentment can be compared to the
presentation of the Germany Army’s passion once news of the offensive
became known (Cole, 1965). While Whiting (1985, p. 4, 33) believes U.S.
troops were relaxed, Forty disagrees (2000, 30-31). This appears similar
with the Germans, Whiting stating they were nervous and tense (p. 88) and
Forty believing they were still determined (p. 30). MacDonald (1984)
continues this assessment stating that the SS Panzer Divisions had morale
highest of all (p. 90). Ambrose’s (2002, p. 383) opinion differs, stating that
the average soldier did not understand the offensive in the west at all which
Whiting agrees as he states threats were used to produce effort (p. 56, 57).
By connecting the various presentations within the literature on the state of
moral forces between the adversaries to Clausewitzian theory it may provide
a theoretical explanation for the offensive’s final result. As well as broad
remarks on moral forces within the Allied and German Armies in their
entirety, some authors, including Robert S. Rush (1999) and Stephen
Ambrose (2001), have narrowed their focus.
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Robert S. Rush’s 1999 journal article, “A Different Perspective:
Cohesion, Morale and Operational Effectiveness in the German Army, Fall
1944” provides an interesting explanation for Whiting’s (1985) presentation
of the German Army’s passion. Although Rush studies an individual Corps
not directly involved in the offensive, the study provides useful information
on the state of moral forces in 1944. Rush is one of many authors who state
that the majority of German soldiers were continuing to fight even though
they did not believe they would ultimately succeed (p. 497). The discussion
then turns to the abuse of tactics, including threats of death, to produce the
moral forces needed for soldiers to fight intensely which provides
explanation for their continued effort. A collection of interviews with the
senior German generals involved in the Ardennes Offensive including Gerd
von Rundstedt, Josef “Sepp” Dietrich, and Hasso von Manteuffel, is
assembled in Danny S. Parker’s text, Hitler’s Ardennes Offensive: The
German View of the Battle of the Bulge (1997). Parker observes the lack of
belief amongst the generals as to the possibility of success which aligns with
Rush’s observation of German soldiers lacking the belief in success in the
overall war. Kleemeier’s (2007) study of moral forces, in particular his
addition of obedience, provides an interesting link to the typical German
soldier’s disbelief in success but continued fighting in combat. The gap in
the literature then lies in whether the belief or disbelief in success, and how
moral forces were produced, effected the actions of the troops and produced
greater force.
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Rush (1999) also provides another layer to the development of moral
forces, stating that newly formed units are unlikely to have as high a state of
morale as those that have served with one another for a longer period of
time (p. 479). As the German Army had recently altered the drafting age to
increase the amount of divisions available for the offensive, nearly one
million soldiers were added to the Army (Blanchette, 1998, p. 17). Stephen
Ambrose in his text, Band of Brothers (2001), follows one U.S. Company
from their first days of combat training to the end of World War II,
including their involvement in the Ardennes. These texts are invaluable,
whereas Whiting (1985) and Forty (2000) provide overall depictions of the
Ardennes and moral forces, Ambrose and Rush provide a more narrowed
examination. The literature also accounts for specific events and situations
within the Ardennes such as Weingartner’s (1979) focus on the Malmédy
Massacre, an event that shook Allied morale, and Marshall’s (1988) focus
on the Siege of Bastogne.
The literature surrounding Allied and German leadership in the
Ardennes Offensive is led by J. D. Morelock’s book, Generals of the
Ardennes: American Leadership in the Battle of the Bulge, (1994).
Morelock focuses on six generals involved in the Ardennes from the
Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, General Dwight. D. Eisenhower
through to Division level. Danny S. Parker’s collection of interviews and
essays in his text, Hitler’s Ardennes Offensive: The German View of the
Battle of the Bulge (1997) is similar; however this collection provides firsthand accounts with the main German generals involved. Both Morelock and
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Parker’s texts provide valuable details that can be analysed and linked for
comparison purposes. An analysis of the literature on Allied and German
leadership will provide the information necessary to discuss the use of
leadership in the planning and execution of the offensive and the effects of
this leadership throughout.
Primary source documents are essential for the analysis to occur,
providing unpolluted accounts of the events. Collections of letters, diary
entries and various documents by Allied forces can be accessed through the
Eisenhower Library. The study of memoirs written following the war, such
as Eisenhower’s Crusade in Europe (1997), Patton & Harkin’s War as I
Knew It (1995), and Bradley’s A Soldier’s Story (1975) occur through a
critical eye due to natural or intended bias. However, the memoirs will be
supported by biographical works which provide detailed examination of the
situation and individuals (Ambrose, 1990; Blumenson, 1985). Cole (1965,
p. 17) Dupuy, et al. (1994, p. 10), and MacDonald (1984, p. 22) agree that a
common objective of the offensive was to cause chaos in Allied leadership.
By analysing the decisions, actions and movements of Allied and German
generals at the three major levels of leadership presented in the literature a
conclusion can be made as to the effectiveness of the utilisation of
leadership in the Ardennes.
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Methodology

This thesis employs historiography as a methodology in its
production. Historiography, or historical research, is the most appropriate
methodology for this analysis as it allows for the different presentations and
interpretations of the offensive to be revealed and allows for an in-depth
study due to the vast amount of information able to be obtained, analysed
and interpreted (Berg, 2001, p. 210-211). By analysing the presentation of
statistical data and varying interpretations of the Ardennes Offensive,
historiography will allow this thesis to provide an explanation as to the
utilisation and effects of physical and moral forces and their effect on the
outcome.
As historiography employs analysis and interpretation of sources it is
reliant on both primary and secondary sources (Berg, 2001). This thesis will
draw its research and evidence from both sources through document
analysis (Lundy, 2008). Primary sources will be primarily from official
histories, memoirs and interviews. The official histories will ensure the
evidence used to support the thesis’ argument is accurate and verifiable, but
will still require a critical eye to catch subjectivity (Andrews, 2008, para. 2).
Secondary sources are also important as they provide analyses and
interpretation of a variety of sources, particularly sources that are unable to
be collected due to research restrictions or limitations. Secondary sources
also often provide the main arguments on the topic following a thorough
examination and can provide quantitative data essential for an analysis of a
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military offensive as this data becomes the constant in which the analysis is
formed around. The limitations as to this methodology are that the analysis
is limited to research previously conducted and literature that is available to
the public.
Historiography as a methodology and historical research and
document analysis as methods allows for a relationship to form between the
theoretical ideas of Carl von Clausewitz and the Ardennes Offensive
(Edwards, 2000, pp. 7-11). Following this, the information obtained can
provide evidence to support the argument that moral forces had a large
effect on the execution and outcome of the Ardennes Offensive which has
previously not been interpreted in such a manner. In doing so, this thesis
will answer the following research questions:
1. Using Clausewitzian theory, what does an analysis of World War
II’s 1944-1945 Ardennes Offensive reveal about the utilisation and
effects of physical and moral forces?
2. To what degree was the Ardennes Offensive determined through
physical or moral forces?
3. What were the main events, operations or situations that effected
moral forces in the Ardennes Offensive?

19

Chapter Two
Leading Up to the Ardennes

This chapter details the events and decisions leading up to the
Ardennes Offensive, beginning from the outbreak of World War II. This
will explain the significance of the offensive to both Germany and the Allies
and the importance of having the port of Antwerp in their possession.
On September 1, 1939 the world was once again plunged into war
(Evans, 2008a; Taylor, 1975). Germany’s invasion of Poland, under the
direction of the Führer of Germany, Adolf Hitler, was quickly followed by a
formal declaration of war by both Britain and France, whilst the United
States, who was not directly threatened due to their remoteness, refused to
intervene in what they considered European affairs (Kimball, 2004, p. 86).
All nations viewed the second war of the century with its predecessor in
mind, thus contributing to their conflicting stances at its outbreak
(Mawdsley, 2009). German Forces and their allies quickly overran nations
to provide the nation’s supposed great need for lebensraum (living space),
this resulted in mass German support for the war effort (Michel, 1973, pp.
xv-xvi). Hitler and the Nazi regime had a number of war goals: conquer
Europe for living space for the Third Reich, reverse the damage caused by
the Treaty of Versailles of World War I, and exterminate races he deemed
responsible or despised (Evans, 2008a).
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The fall of France on June 22, 1940 was both unexpected and a
debilitating blow to the Allies. Germany, however, was soon to be at the
height of their eventual six year war. Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet
Union in June 1941 began the start of Germany’s downfall. Against the
advice of his senior generals and turning against the non-aggression pact
between Germany and the Soviet Union, Hitler ordered for a full-scale
attack on the Soviets named Operation Barbarossa (Mawdsley, 2009;
Michel, 1973, p. 9). World War II scholars almost unanimously agree that
Operation Barbarossa was a gamble that German Forces were not prepared
for logistically or operationally (Mawdsley, 2009; Taylor, 1975). A year
after Operation Barbarossa began it was evident that the German Army was
running out of resources, they were simply unable to match the speed in
which the Allies were able to produce and dispatch equipment (Taylor,
1975, p. 32). While the invasion of the Soviet Union was always a major
war aim, it was also necessary to gain the resources needed to continue the
war.
Whilst still not directly involved, the United States became according
to Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, General Dwight D.
Eisenhower (1997), the “arsenal of democracy” (p. 1) in their fight against
Nazism and their principles, ranging from totalitarianism to expansionism.
The United States became an essential part of the Allied Powers with their
program titled ‘lend-lease’ providing material, equipment and supplies to
the Allied nations to assist in the fight against the Nazis (Lovelace, 2014, p.
593). It was not until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941
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that the United States was forced to declare war on the aggressor. Germany,
after signing the Tripartite Pact with Japan, was then forced to declare war
on the United States. The war had officially become a world war fought in
the air, sea, and on the land with all the Great Powers involved (Michel,
1973, p. 120; Taylor, 1975, p. 81, 127).

The Western Allies - United States, Britain and France, prepared for a
number of years to begin an invasion of Europe and defeat Nazi Germany,
to coincide with operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean. On June
6, 1944, the invasion began in Normandy, France. The next few months
were debilitating for German forces, as they began losing huge numbers of
territory, men and equipment as the Allies swept through France and
Belgium towards Germany. In doing so, the port of Antwerp, located north
of the Ardennes region of Belgium, was lost to Allied forces (Cole, 1965;
MacDonald, 1984). This port had significance to both the Allies and
Germans. In Allied hands, their logistical situation would be partially
solved; the supplies needed in their pursuit to destroy Nazi Germany would
arrive from Britain in Antwerp, shortening supply lines. The assistance of
Antwerp’s port would only speed up German demise. Thus, it was in
Germany’s best interest to do what was necessary to keep Antwerp out of
Allied hands as it was only a matter of time before they, as well as Soviet
forces from the East, pushed into Berlin (Evans, 2008, p. 657). Whilst Stalin
was able to operate the Soviet war against Nazi Germany in his separate
theatre of war, Britain and the United States were required to collaborate
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with one another. Whilst necessary, it was not easy (Weinberg, 1994, p.
722).
The motivation of the Allied nations to fight against Nazism can be
summed up by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, General
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s reflections in his post-war book, Crusade in
Europe (1997): “We could not afford to sit still doing nothing” (p. 340).
Nazi Germany had almost total power and control over their occupied
territories, submitting these nations to their rules and ideological standings,
exterminating millions of people that they blamed for Germany’s demise in
World War I, including the Jews and Communists, and ruining economies
and industries to support the war effort. By 1944, Germany had lost most of
its allies; Romania, Bulgaria and Finland had deserted Germany, the Allies
were fighting firmly in Italy, and nations were now beginning to
increasingly refuse Germany the resources they relied on (Michel, 1973, p.
55; Taylor, 1975, p. 124). Not only was the military situation declining, the
morale of both the troops and population followed (Evans, 2008b, p. 468).
With the Allies closing in on from both east and west, Hitler’s ‘no
withdrawal’ mindset left two options available: an offensive in the east, or
the west. Hitler decided on the west. In December, 1944, a mere six months
before the conclusion of the War in Europe, Germany launched its last
major offensive in the Ardennes; an offensive that was significant to both
Allied and Axis Powers in a time of such desperation.

23

On September 16, 1944, Adolf Hitler had his daily morning meeting
in his office with Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, the German High Command of
the Armed Forces (OKW) and the Armed Forces Operations Staff, including
Generaldfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel (Mawdsley, 2009, p. 391; Parker,
1997, p. 233; Whiting, 1985, pp. 10-11). Jodl, as the Chief of the Operations
Staff, who was charged with planning and operations, announced
Germany’s grim situation. Amongst the various other matters, the heavily
valued port of Antwerp was currently in Allied hands (Whiting, 1985, p.
23). Not yet fully operational, Antwerp had the potential to drastically
increase the amount of supplies available and speed up the Allied drive into
Germany (Bradley, 1975, p. 416). Both Allied Forces in the West and
Soviet Forces in the East were regrouping and organising supply lines and
replacements troops, resulting in them being unable, for the time-being, to
continue movement towards Germany (Evans, 2008b, p. 657). After Jodl
discussed the Allied situation Hitler suddenly announced his decision that
he firmly believed would turn the war back in Germany’s favour: "‘I have
just made a momentous decision. I shall go over to the counter-attack, that is
to say…here, out of the Ardennes, with the objective--Antwerp’” (cited in
Cole, p. 2).

The decision to form an offensive in the west with Antwerp as the
main objective was based upon the facts that the Soviet Red Army was
overwhelming in comparison to the Western Allies, and the distances in the
Soviet Union were too large to gain any major objectives with the forces
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available (Cirillo, 2003, p. 4; Whiting, 1985, p. 220). The route to Antwerp
would be through the heavily forested region made up of the Ardennes and
Eifel, a distance of 150 kilometres (Cole, 1965, p. 39; Whiting, 1985, p. 23).
The small towns in the area are essential to the road system, the most
important being Bastogne in the south and St. Vith and Malmédy in the
north as they are essential to occupying the area (Cirillo, 2003, p. 6). The
region is composed of forests, hills, ridges and valleys with the main rivers
being the Meuse and the Our (Dupuy, et al., 1994, p. 10; MacDonald, 1993,
p. 19) Cole (1965) describes the terrain: “The area through which Hitler
chose to launch his counteroffensive was, with the exception of the Vosges,
the most difficult terrain on the entire line of the Western Front” (p. 39).

In December 1944, the ninety-six kilometre front of the Ardennes
was defended by four divisions of the VIII Corps, U.S. First Army, 12th
Army Group, commanded by Corps Commander Major General Troy
Middleton (Dupuy, et al., 1994; MacDonald, 1984, p. 50). With only the
4th, 28th and 106th Infantry Divisions and 9th Armoured Division, totalling
68,822 troops, defending such a vast area, the Allies were obviously not
expecting an attack (Bradley, 1975, p. 439; Eisenhower, 1997, p. 345;
Smith, 2014). Hitler based the plan on this assumption (Cole, 1965, p. 48).
Eisenhower describes the reasoning for the decision to place only four
divisions along the front, “Our conclusion was that in the Ardennes region
we were running a definite risk but we believed it to be a mistaken policy to
suspend our attacks all along the front merely to make ourselves safe until
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all reinforcements arriving from the United States could bring us up to peak
strength” (p. 228). Two of the divisions in the Ardennes were ‘green’ units,
meaning they were newly formed. The remaining two were veteran
divisions resting and refitting after months of heavy fighting (Cirillo, 2003,
p. 7; MacDonald, 1984). Under General Montgomery, the British 21st Army
Group and the First Canadian Army were situated north of the Ardennes and
under General Devers, elements of the the U.S. 6th Army Group were in the
south (MacDonald, 1984, p. 49-50). Hitler aimed to capitalise on the Allied
decision to only lightly defend the area.
Hitler’s military advisors were struggling with his decision. Their
desire to act in accordance with the Führer’s orders was contrasted by the
desire to act according to appropriate military tactics and planning. The
literature makes an important note to almost all aspects of Hitler’s plans for
the offensive being almost identical to the offensive which took place
through the Ardennes in 1940 which resulted in great success (Forty, 2000;
Goolrick & Tanner, 1979). Despite the differences in season, weather and
most importantly the current state of the German Army, and the United
States defenders being of greater calibre than the French Army in 1940, the
offensive was almost a carbon copy (Cole, 1965, p. 18; Forty, 2000, p. 65).
Jodl, as the Chief of the Operations Staff, was tasked with making a detailed
plan according to the German Army’s capabilities; however Hitler
continuously argued that Antwerp as the objective was non-negotiable
(Cole, 1965, p. 17). Jodl disagreed but the plan went forth to Gerd von
Rundstedt, the Commander-in-Chief West, and Field Marshal Walter Model
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of Army Group B, whose Armies were to form the attack. Both men quickly
agreed with Jodl that the objective was as von Rundstedt states, “far too
ambitious” (cited in MacDonald, 1984, p. 35). It should also be noted that
von Rundstedt was only recently reinstated to Commander-in-Chief West
after Hitler had taken the position from him earlier in the year - another
aspect Hitler was attempting to recreate from the 1940 offensive. Just a few
of the problems with the plan included German troops having less training
and experience than they had in 1940, the supplies available not being in
proportion to the objective, the Allie’s air superiority, the Army’s flanks
would be exposed, and the need for manpower would require changes to
conscription and men fighting in the East (Cole, 1965, p. 25; Forty, 2000, p.
42; Parker, 1997, p. 73).
In an attempt to give the German Army a chance at success, the
leaders discussed five alternative plans that would be appropriate for the
physical forces available to them and according to the state of morale after
five years of war (Hart, 1983, p. 447). All plans were dismissed; Hitler’s
failure to logically assess the disagreements put forward by his staff resulted
in the plan moving forward with little alterations. Following this, the Army
commanders who were to be involved then became privy to the plan.
Generaloberst der Waffen-SS Josef “Sepp” Dietrich of the Sixth Panzer
Army, General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel of the Fifth Panzer
Army and General der Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger of the Seventh
Army also all disagreed. Von Manteuffel and his superior, Model, managed
to get Hitler to change various tactical details but it became apparent that the
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offensive would be executed according to the plan set forth months earlier
by Hitler (Cole, 1965, p. 173). Dietrich, whose Army was to form the main
thrust asserts his opinion:

All Hitler wants me to do is cross a river, capture Brussels, and
then go on and take Antwerp! And all this in the worst time of
the year through the Ardennes where the snow is waist deep and
there isn’t room to deploy four tanks abreast let alone armored
divisions! Where it doesn’t get light until eight and it’s dark
again at four and with re-formed divisions made up chiefly of
kids and sick old men – and at Christmas! (MacDonald, 1984, p.
37)

The plan was as follows: Army Group B under Field Marshal Walter
Model would have three armies for the offensive. Beginning at 5:30am on
December 16, 1944, the three armies would launch their attacks with
infantry, followed by tanks, through the Ardennes between Monschau and
Echternach (Dupuy, et al., 1994, p. 17; Hart, 1983, p. 458). The Sixth
Panzer Army under the leadership of Dietrich would be the main attacking
army and would be opposing the U.S. 99th Infantry of the V Corps. They
were to move northeast, cross the Meuse River between Liege and Huy,
then continue to Antwerp (Cole, 1965, p. 19; Hart, 1983, p. 198). They were
to capture the town, Malmédy, in doing so. The Fifth Panzer Army under
von Manteuffel were to cover the left flank of Dietrich’s Army by holding
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the line approximately 15 miles to its south with the towns Dinant, Namur,
Brussels and Antwerp along this line (Cole, 1965, p. 75). In doing so, the
Fifth Panzer Army would cross the Meuse River between Huy and Dinant
then move on to Brussels (Parker, 1997, p. 236). They were facing the U.S.
106th and 28th Infantry Divisions and were to capture St. Vith and Bastogne
(Toland, 1999, p. 20). The Seventh Army under Brandenberger was to
provide a supplementary role; composed mainly of infantry, their aim was
to cover the south flank of the Fifth Panzer Army and would be facing the
U.S. 28th and 4th Infantry Divisions. The first objective of reaching the
Meuse River was to be reached in four days (Cirillo, 2003, p. 28). The need
to successfully recapture Antwerp quickly was essential before the Allies
could produce a staunch defense. If successful, Cirillo (2003) states that a
third of the Allied ground forces would be annihilated (p. 5).
Although Antwerp was the major objective of the offensive, scholars
studying the offensive discuss additional aims. Along with the logistical
problems resulting from the capture of Antwerp, Hugh M. Cole, the United
States Army’s official historian, in his official text, The Battle of the Bulge
(1965), states Hitler declared the separation and encirclement of the British
(and Canadian) forces to the north from the United States forces in the south
would lead to chaos between British and United States leaders (p. 17). He
saw the Allied coalition as a front with tension and conflict behind what he
considered an allied façade. Once the Allies were destroyed and in
disagreement with one another, Hitler believed this would force them to
surrender and he could force a separate peace treaty from the East then
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focus solely on destroying the Soviets (Cooke & Evans, 2008, p. 9; Whiting,
1985, p. 22).
Along with the obvious need for an advantage in physical and moral
forces, German success was heavily dependent on a number of factors.
Danny S. Parker in his text, Hitler's Ardennes Offensive: The German view
of the Battle of the Bulge (1997), assembled various interviews and essays
by the key leaders involved in the offensive. Jodl, von Manteuffel, and
Brandenberger all state that a primary factor necessary for success would be
extreme weather, that of fog, mist, rain, heavy winds and snow (pp. 6, 141,
225) This would force the grounding of the superior Allied air force (Cirillo,
2003, p. 5). The importance of the air force is evident in Eisenhower’s
(1997) memoir as he states, “As long as the weather kept our planes on the
ground it would be an ally of the enemy worth many additional divisions”
(p. 345). This grounding would firstly, prevent the Allies from conducting
aerial reconnaissance and discovering the massive build-up in the SchneeEifel (p. 346), secondly, prevent the Allies from conducting defensive
operations from the air, and lastly, from dropping essential supplies to their
troops.
The prevention of Allied intelligence becoming privy to the
upcoming offensive would also be dependent on keeping any information
pertaining to the offensive secret. Hitler was so insistent on total secrecy
that historian, Cole (1965), states the death penalty was the ultimate
consequence and the small number of men privy to the plan were required to
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sign contracts as to this condition (p. 49). In addition, the offensive was
named ‘Wacht Am Rhein’ (Watch on the Rhine) to appear to be a defensive
action (Cooke & Evans, 2008, p. 9), misinformation was purposefully
recorded in documents (MacDonald, 1984, p. 39, 40), and a complete radio
silence was ordered (Cirillo, 2003, p. 10; Dupuy, et al., 1994, p. 37). The
secrecy that was so essential was necessary to successfully surprise (and
then destroy) the four divisions that defended the area. If any information
was to be discovered by the Allies, they would quickly reinforce the area
and the possibility of procuring Antwerp would be even more improbable.
The tactic known as Blitzkrieg, involving surprise and speed, was
often employed by the German Army in World War (Evans, 2008b, p. 179;
Hart, 1970, p. 27). With total secrecy, the ability to surprise the four
divisions, the 4th, 29th and 106th Infantry Divisions and the 9th Armoured
Divisions of the First Army, in the Ardennes was essential as it would
provide the ultimate advantage (Smith, 2014). The Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) deemed the Ardennes not conducive
to an offensive and consequently, were not concerned with such a
possibility and placed only four divisions in defense of the area (Smith,
2014). The lack of Allied intelligence (of which they were usually highly
confident in) also contributed to this assessment and would assist in the next
factor necessary for success in the Allied High Command underestimating
the force of the attack and failing to produce swift countermeasures
(Blumenson, 1985, p. 245). If so, the first elements of the German Army
were expecting to reach the Meuse River in less than four days (Parker,

31

1997, p. 6). However, to do so they were dependent on fuel. If the German
Army were to reach Antwerp, the capture of Allied fuel supplies that were
located in Liege and Verdun to the west of the Meuse River were essential
(Eisenhower, 1997, p. 338, 348-9). Supplies were so low that the German
Army was not expected to even reach Antwerp without obtaining the
enemy’s supplies.
The Ardennes Offensive, more commonly known as the “Battle of
the Bulge” due to the German penetration creating a bulge in the Allied line
began on December 16, 1944 (Eisenhower, 1997, p. 335). The planning and
execution took place entirely under Adolf Hitler’s personal command. His
interference in the planning stages was filled with disagreement from his
military advisors and generals. Yet the offensive moved forward with the
main objective being to capture the port of Antwerp. Relying on various
aspects for success, the offensive needed to employ total secrecy and the
tactic of Blitzkrieg if it were to have any chance of successfully surprising
and destroying Allied forces in the region. To provide further insight into
why the Ardennes Offensive failed so miserably for the German Army the
following chapter will analyse the utilisation and effects of physical forces.
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Chapter Three
Physical Forces in the Ardennes

When analysing the Ardennes Offensive we must first make ourselves
acquainted with the physical forces as these provide qualitative figures that
become the foundation for further examination, and the basis for Chapter
Four’s analysis of moral forces as the two are interconnected. This chapter
will demonstrate the physical standings at the offensive’s commencement as
the offensive was dependent on a large physical advantage. Following this,
the discussion will then center on how each side utilised their physical
forces, whether this utilisation was advantageous, and the effects of this.
Physical Standings of the German and Allied Armies
Carl von Clausewitz in Book Three, Chapter 8 of On War (1993),
originally published in 1832, classifies physical forces as one of the five
elements of strategy that characterise an engagement (p. 215). The
framework for physical forces consists of three elements: the size of the
armed forces, their composition, and their armament (materiel and
equipment). These elements are often the focus when examining historical
military events and often the only strategic element examined. This is
fundamentally flawed for two reasons. Firstly, according to Clausewitz,
military action, and warfare itself, is never concentrated against physical
forces alone, it is also concentrated against moral elements, and always
endeavours to break-down an adversary’s moral forces (p. 157). Secondly,
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physical destruction will always have a moral effect; consequently the two,
physical and moral, cannot be analysed without consideration for the other.
However, this is not to say that physical forces are not important; in fact, the
opposite is true: their importance is impossible to overlook. Without an
appropriate armed force utilising modern and quality equipment the armed
force has little chance of success as all warfare is based on the destruction of
an enemy’s force, and the way to achieve this is primarily through the
utilisation of physical forces (p. 111).
When analysing the utilisation of German and Allied physical forces
in the Ardennes Offensive it seems appropriate to initially concentrate on
their physical standings at its commencement on December 16, 1944. The
first of the three theoretical principles stipulated by Clausewitz in On War
(1993) Book Three, Chapter 8 is the ‘most general principle of victory’:
superiority of numbers, meaning a vastly superior army in terms of numbers
is the element most closely aligned with victory (p. 155, 228). Although it
would be naïve to state that numbers alone determine an engagement’s
outcome, it is extremely important (Brodie cited in Clausewitz, 1993, p.
296). The German Army as the attacking force quite clearly had the
advantage in terms of the size of their armed force (Ambrose, 2001, p. 173).
With three armies, the Sixth Panzer Army, the Fifth Panzer Army, and the
Seventh Army involved, the total number of German troops attacking Allied
Forces in the Ardennes was over 250,000 (Morelock, 1994, p. 7; Toland,
1959, p. x). United States Forces occupying and defending the 100kilometre front totalled 68,822, Morelock (1994) accounts it to “one soldier
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for every 2 meters” the majority of which were the VIII Corps, which
consisted of just over three divisions (Morelock, 1994, p. 235; Toland,
1959. p. 12). Following Clausewitz’s theoretical principles, with German
Forces outnumbering Allied Forces to such a high degree the Germans held
the principle of victory at the offensive’s commencement with numerical
superiority.
After examining the quantity of troops, we must now turn to the
quality and composition. Situated in the Ardennes on December 16 were
Major General Troy Middleton’s VIII Corps, consisting of just over three
divisions. The Ardennes was described as “the nursery and the old folk’s
home of the American command” (cited in Morelock, 1994, p. 30) which
refers to the 4th and 28th Infantry Divisions who were resting and refitting
after heavy fighting in the Huertgen Forest in October and November 1944;
they were undermanned and exhausted (Morelock, 1994, p. 234; Toland,
1999, pp. 4, 5). The remaining two divisions were on the opposite end of the
scale: the 106th Infantry Division had only recently arrived and had no
experience in combat. The remaining troops made up the 9th Armoured
Division. The 28th, the veteran division, and the 106th, the inexperienced
division, were the main target by the German Army on December 16 in the
battle for Antwerp. The German Army was in a similar situation with the
character of its troops; with five years of continuous warfare the German
Army was forced to modify the enlistment age – dropping to 16 years and
increasing to 60 years (Cole, 1965; Morelock, 1994, pp. 22-23). In doing so,
they were able to create 25 new ‘Volksgrandier Divisions’, however these
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divisions were not adequately trained and were not appropriately equipped
for such a large undertaking (Cirillo, 2003, p. 4). Many of these new
divisions were involved in the offensive. In contrast to the four U.S.
divisions involved on December 16, the German Army had thirteen infantry
divisions, seven panzer divisions and two panzer brigades (Cirillo, 2003, p.
4). The German Army held physical superiority in almost all respects.
The German Army’s advantage in physical forces becomes even
more apparent with the final element of armament. Whilst we are forced to
adapt Clausewitz’s nineteenth century thinking to modern equipment, the
theory remains unchanged. Historians, including Morelock (1994) and Cole
(1965) offer a comprehensive account of the materiel and equipment
available to either side. In his text, Generals of the Ardennes: American
Leadership in the Battle of the Bulge, J.D. Morelock (1994) expands on the
figures by providing a detailed comparison of the equipment utilised by
infantrymen, tankers and artillerymen in the Ardennes Offensive. In 1944
the U.S. had the advantage in superior infantry and artillery equipment in
terms of both quality and supply, particularly shoulder weapons; however as
the offensive intensified the Germans actually had the advantage at almost
eight to one in infantry; they were also superior in machine pistols and
machine guns (Cole, 1965). Similarly, the Germans also had the advantage
to their U.S. equivalent in infantry support and antitank weapons (Morelock,
1994, p. 14, 22). The major difference, however, was in tanks. The German
Panther and Tiger tanks were renowned in World War II, forcing the U.S. to
attempt to compete not in quality but in quantity of their Sherman tanks. At
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its commencement, Morelock states the Germans had a four to one
advantage in tanks totalling fourteen hundred against the 242 of the VIII
Corps (Morelock, 1994, p. 7, 235; Toland, 1999, p. x). On the other hand,
the U.S Army had become increasingly mobile; the German Army could not
compare, still relying on horses for transport even after five years of war.
Lastly, air support initially favoured the Germans simply for the fact that the
weather conditions prevented Allied Forces from utilising their air support
for intelligence purposes, logistical reinforcement, and offensive tactics
(Morelock, 1994, p. 15). This last element was a major factor in the
planning of the offensive.
Morelock (1994) presents an interesting depiction of the U.S. Army
in World War II that had a large effect on the utilisation of their physical
forces: standardization (p. 11, 12). U.S. standardization created yet another
distinction with the German Army as it allowed for a more resourceful use
of materiel, equipment and supplies; whereas the German Army, with its
unstandardized organisation resulted in a lack of efficiency as specialised
divisions relied on varied resources and this “could impact on supply,
maintenance and training and a commander’s tactical control” (p. 12). The
increased mobility of the U.S. Army by 1944, and its standardization, made
it one of the greatest armies in the world (Cole, 1965). However, the
German Army’s superiority of numbers was great, thus if they could break
through to the west in an undermanned region, destroy as many Allied
forces as possible and dash through to Antwerp, Adolf Hitler believed it
would change the tide of the war. The Ardennes region, defended by only
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four infantry divisions totalling less than 70,000 troops, was this ideal
region.
The Utilisation and Effects of Physical Forces
The literature largely agrees that the German Army effectively
utilised their superiority of numbers by applying Clausewitz’s principle
aligning with this superiority – the maximum use of force (Cirillo, 2003;
Eisenhower, 1997; Hart, 1983). By employing a complete silence and strict
confidentiality clause (with serious consequences if broken) they managed
to successfully build-up an enormous physical force with Allied intelligence
remaining uninformed, apart from heresy from locals that was quickly
dismissed (Bradley, 1975; Eisenhower, 1997). Hitler firmly believed that
with their numerical superiority the German Army would quickly overrun
the four divisions defending the Ardennes. General Hasso von Manteuffel
(cited in Parker, 1997) describes the plan: The plan was for the troops of the
Sixth Panzer Army to form the main thrust against two U.S. divisions in the
north-east and reach Antwerp in less than a week by crossing the Meuse
River between Líege and Huy (cited in Morelock, 1994, p. 5). The Fifth
Panzer Army was to cross the Meuse River between Namur and Dinant and
the Seventh Army was to protect the flank. On December 16, thirteen
infantry divisions and seven panzer divisions thrust through the Ardennes to
attack the surprised Allied Forces accompanied by one thousand tanks
(Cirillo, 2003, p. 4). Historians examining this offensive have provided
another layer of interest by observing the utilisation of an SS Army, the
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Sixth Panzer, in the main role. Parker’s (1997) text, Hitler's Ardennes
Offensive: The German View of the Battle of the Bulge, implies this was no
coincidence and was purely for the glory that would result from the
expected victory. Hitler wanted this glory to be placed upon the SS, not the
regular German Army.
While many historians, including Parker (1997) identify the initial
German superiority as an initial advantage, further research discovered that
this advantage was unable to be effectively exploited. The sheer volume and
force of German armament clogged the roads due to the unsuitable terrain
creating a build-up of supply lines and traffic jams (the poorly constructed
roads also meant that the U.S. Army’s mobility became a large advantage)
(Cole, 1965). The utilisation of such a large volume of tanks and equipment
was also reliant on an adequate fuel supply, of which the German Army did
not have (Parker, 1997). Consequently, the need to capture Allied fuel
supplies became a major operation during the execution of the offensive; the
need to quickly cross the Meuse River was, in part, because of the fuel
supplies located there (Toland, 1999). With a fuel supply adequate for less
than a 100 kilometre journey, and a terrain obstructing tanks and equipment,
fuel was used at a higher rate than expected (McManus, 2007). The German
Forces were then unable to utilise their physical forces to their full capacity.
The utilisation of physical forces in unsuitable terrain and without the
proper equipment became a major complication that prevented the armies
from exploiting the surprised and undermanned area defended by the U.S.
VIII Corps who were unprepared and unequipped for such an attack.
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Evidence to support this can be seen in Parker’s (1997) compilation of
interviews in which Dietrich and von Manteuffel, of the Sixth Panzer and
Fifth Panzer Armies, state that the terrain and inadequate fuel supplies were
major factors that assisted in their defeat. Von Manteuffel states that by the
fourth day, it was evident that the offensive had failed. The analysis reveals
that Clausewitz’s theoretical principle of superiority of numbers had a large
counter effect for German Forces on the German offensive.
The German High Command was depending on Eisenhower and his
advisors underestimating the sheer force of the offensive and consequently
taking an extensive amount of time to utilise U.S. strategic reserves (Cole,
1965; Dupuy, et al., 1994). Following the December 16 breakthrough, the
following day Eisenhower’s immediate direction for the 82d and 101st
Airborne Divisions to move to St. Vith and Bastogne had a large effect on
the German timetable (Ambrose, 2002, p. 197) Not only were two major
towns now heavily defended since the arrival of the 82d and 101st Airborne
Divisions on December 19, there were now approximately 30,000 troops
brought into the two towns and surrounding areas, decreasing the German
numerical advantage and preoccupying thousands of German troops. In On
War, Clausewitz (1993) positions his view on strategic reserves, declaring it
an ‘essential condition of strategic leadership’ to hold reserves in direct
relation to the ‘degree of strategic uncertainty’ (p. 247). This will be
discussed in detail in Chapter Five due to the moral nature of intuition
leading this decision. However, the utilisation of such strategic reserves in
such a rapid manner without full understanding of the situation undoubtedly
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played a large role in preventing German Forces from exploiting the
undermanned Ardennes (Ambrose, 2001; Cole, 1965; McManus, 2007;
Toland, 1999).
Along with the utilisation of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions,
the strategic reserves for the entire northwest Europe, Eisenhower (1997)
ordered for the movement of physical forces still in Normandy to the
Ardennes. Ambrose (2001) provides data of 250,000 men and 50,000
vehicles moving to support Allied Forces in the Ardennes (p. 174). German
Forces no longer had numerical superiority. The relatively clear routes
outlined in the German planning stages were now heavily defended, creating
additional obstacles. Ambrose (2001) boldly states the extraordinary
movement of such a large number of forces to the Ardennes as an
“achievement unprecedented in the history of war” (p. 174). The German
advantage decreased even further on December 23rd, one week from the
offensives commencement, when the weather cleared. The weather
conditions (fog, mist, and snow) were no longer an assistive element to the
Germans as Allied air support was now able to be brought into the
offensive. The Allies were now able to receive reinforcement of their
physical forces by air and were supported with additional defense
(Ambrose, 2001, p. 186; 2002, p. 225). This was a major factor that effected
German success in the Ardennes.
Historians, in their examinations following the offensive, and the
major German leaders involved before and during the offensive, agree that a
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key element needed for German success was to successfully surprise the
U.S. VIII Corps defending the Ardennes and consequently Allied leaders
(Parker, 1997; Toland, 1999). Clausewitz describes surprise as “the means
to gain superiority” (1993, p. 233). Utilising physical forces in conjunction
with surprise can result in a devastating moral effect on the enemy, creating
chaos and confusion, and allowing the surprised defenders little time to
comprehend the attack. The Germany Army frequently utilised their
physical forces through the medium of surprise throughout the war (and
were highly successful in doing so). While by 1944 it was a well-known
tactic by the enemy, in the 1944 Ardennes Offensive it was highly
successful in its effect; chaos and confusion formed amongst the troops
defending the Ardennes following the December 16 breakthrough and
continued to the highest personnel. Allied commanders differed heavily in
their strategies to combat the breakthrough, and as there was not one sole
ground commander, disagreements prevented quick response to the attack.
Eisenhower, in an attempt to revert the chaos that had resulted, deemed it
necessary to have one sole ground commander. The effect of the German
breakthrough was a complete command handover of ground forces north of
Bastogne to General Montgomery on December 20, 1944 (Morelock, 1994,
p. 64, 66). The chaos and disorder that German High Command was
expecting amongst Allied High Command, was certainly an effect of the
breakthrough.
Whilst unrelated to any specific principles recognised by Clausewitz,
the effect of disagreement between these key players undoubtedly effected
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the eventual utilisation of physical forces. With Montgomery’s new control,
he became, according to Eisenhower (1997) and General Bradley (1975),
over-cautious and unwilling to commit to a swift counterattack. Weigley
(cited in Morelock, 1994, p.68) distinguishes Montgomery as focusing
strategically on organising forces for the final goal of defeating German
forces by pushing into Berlin and ending the war under his single control as
ground forces commander. Thus, Montgomery extending the Ardennes
Offensive was a consequence of him planning beyond the offensive and
centering these plans upon recognition and ultimately his envisaged
reputation. Eisenhower, on the other hand, wanted a swift counterattack to
take control of the offensive and defeat Germany’s last reserves which
would ultimately affect the Allied drive across the Ruhr and into Germany
(Morelock, 1994, p. 68). Following this a major consequence of the
utilisation of physical forces and the change in command was the
relationships between the military leaders.
As shown, the decision on when to form a counterattack was a
source of major disagreement between Allied leaders. The utilisation of
physical forces by Montgomery in the counteroffensive was deemed slow
by Eisenhower and various other commanders (Bradley, 1975, p. 416;
Morelock, 1994, p. 68). Eisenhower wanted to “exploit the opportunity”
(Weigley, cited in Morelock, p. 68) produced by the German offensive as he
saw it as an opportunity to capitalise on by destroying as many German
forces, materiel and equipment as possible to make the eventual journey into
Germany easier (Morelock, 1994, p. 63). Consequently, he sought to initiate
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a counteroffensive as quickly as possible once strategic reserves and
additional forces had moved into play to assist in the defense of the
Ardennes. Whilst General George S. Patton, commander of the U.S. Third
Army had initiated his part of the counteroffensive in late December, it was
not until January 3, 1945 that Montgomery initiated his part of the
counteroffensive (Ambrose, 2001, p. 191). The literature refers to this date
as the beginning of Allied movement into Germany. The effect of this slow
utilisation of physical forces was large. Ultimately, it allowed a large
amount of German troops to withdraw and join the final defense of
Germany, and also affected the Allies own timetable as the Armies did not
link up until two weeks later on January 17, 1945, one week before the
conclusion of the offensive (Ambrose, 2001, p. 191).
The utilisation of physical forces was also a source of disagreement
amongst German commanders, with the majority stating that the quantity of
physical forces did not align with the objective. As the physical components
were vastly different from those involved in the 1940 offensive, their use
and the calibre was a source of disagreement. Evidence of the obvious state
of physical forces not matching with the objective can be seen in the
interviews conducted following the conclusion of World War II with the
generals involved in the Ardennes Offensive (Parker, 1997). Dietrich stated
that from the planning stage he knew the undertaking was not likely to
succeed. Even with this initial advantage, the generals still did not agree
with the proportion of physical forces (Parker, 1997). Additional support for
this lies in von Manteuffel’s interview. Thus, while they may have had the
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initial advantage in numbers alone, von Manteuffel in a post-war interview
admitted that he proclaimed the lesser calibre of the current state of the
German Army than the German Army in 1940 (of which the 1944 Ardennes
Offensive was based). Further evidence to support this claim is discussed
largely in the literature. The addition of one million young, old and injured
men resulted in a need to decrease training and attempt to bridge this gap by
increased equipment (Toland, 1999). While German Forces may have had
the advantage in numbers the quality of troops decreased.
Clausewitz (1993) states the effects of effort can be seen in the loss
of forces and territory (p. 105). In analysing the Ardennes Offensive these
effects are evident. Arguably, the greatest effect throughout the five week
period was the loss of thousands of troops, and large numbers of material
and equipment. The effects of the ineffective utilisation of physical forces
by German forces was casualties totalling over 100,000, or one fifth of the
forces utilised, that ultimately resulted in no territory gained or objectives
seized, and that should have been used in the final defense of Germany
(MacDonald, 1984). On the Allied side, the effect was 80,000 casualties, of
the 600,000 troops utilised, that resulted from defending territory they were
already occupying (Ambrose, 2001, p. 173). However, whilst the physical
effects were important, equally as important were the effects on moral
forces. As Clausewitz (1993) states:
Physical casualties are not the only losses incurred by both sides
in the course of the engagement: their moral strength is also
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shaken, broken and ruined. In deciding whether or not to continue
the engagement it is not enough to consider the loss of men,
horses and guns; one also has to weigh the loss of order, courage,
confidence, cohesion, and planning. The decision rests chiefly on
the state of morale, which, in cases where the victor has lost as
much as the vanquished, has always been the single decisive
factor (p. 273).
Thus, it seems appropriate to now turn to the analysis of the utilisation and
effects of moral forces in the Ardennes Offensive.
This chapter demonstrates the effect of the German Forces relying on
unreliable aspects, such as the slow response from Allied Forces to the
offensive, the requirement of capturing Allied fuel supplies, and weather
conditions favouring German movement by forced grounding of U.S. air
support. This chapter reveals the initial German superiority of numbers was
not effectively exploited due to ineffective planning and study of the
Ardennes terrain and the unmatched physical forces to the geographical
conditions. On December 23rd, one week following the commencement, the
final element of weather seemed to decide the fate of the German offensive.
By the offensive’s conclusion, over 600,000 Allied troops had been
involved and over 500,000 German troops. The analysis concludes that
whilst the initial superiority was with the Germans, the quick movement by
Allied leaders quickly evened the playing field (Ambrose, 2001, p. 184).
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Chapter Four
Moral Forces in the Ardennes

Now that we have analysed physical forces that are quantifiable and
therefore comparable, it is time to turn to the moral. The previous chapter
demonstrated the disproportion of physical forces advantageous to German
Forces in the first stage of the Ardennes Offensive. Beginning on December
16, 1944, 250,000 German forces broke through the Ardennes. Defended by
68,822 United States troops, German forces were expecting to reach the
Meuse River in just four days before moving towards Antwerp under the
expectation that their superiority of numbers would overpower the lightly
defended area (Cirillo, 2003). However, the addition of unsuitable terrain,
lack of fuel, and unpredictable weather conditions created additional
obstacles that prevented the effective utilisation of the physical forces.
Whilst these obstacles contributed to slow attacking movements, allowing
Allied Force to regroup, reorganise and move troops to join the defense, an
analysis of the offensive reveals another element crucial to Allied defense of
the area: moral forces. The courage, morale, and skill of the commanders
involved contributes to the explanation of why Allied Forces were able to
hold off the initial attack before the physical forces were able to be equalled.
Various events, including the Siege of Bastogne, were physically
unbalanced, thus an explanation can be derived from analysing the
utilisation and effects of moral forces to provide support for the notion that

47

physical and moral forces combined to produce Allied success in the
Ardennes.
In On War (1993), Carl von Clausewitz states that “The highest of all
moral qualities in times of danger is courage” (p. 97), adding “courage is the
soldier’s first requirement” (p. 116). There are three types of courage in
Clausewitz’s theory on moral forces, however only the first will be
discussed. This type of courage - courage when in ‘personal danger’ consists of two elements: Clausewitz states it may be an ‘indifference to
danger’ which may result from a variety of reasons but is most often due to
habit (Kleemeier, 2007, p. 115). The second source of courage when in
danger is ‘positive motives’ such as patriotism or ambition. Clausewitz has
very specific comments on both. He states that when courage is the result of
habit it is a constant condition and will not let one down; the second is an
emotion; it is not as dependable but will have greater results (Clausewitz,
1993, p. 116). The combination of both types is the most effective as it will
result in dependable, great actions. Both Allied and German Forces
undoubtedly showed courage over the five week period, however the
sources of courage is what differentiates the adversaries. An important point
to note is that, by this time, Germany was “forced to turn to their children to
fight the war to a conclusion” (Ambrose, 2002, p. 207; Goolrick & Tanner,
1979). For the German Forces this meant that while these new combatants
had little to no experience and could therefore not rely on courage sourced
from habit, they had grown-up only with memories of their nation under
Hitler’s regime and the ruling of Nazi ideology over all aspects of life
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(Goolrick & Tanner, 1979). In many cases these young men would be
considered more patriotic than their elders in the Wehrmacht and following
Clausewitz’s theory would produce greater acts of courage.
The literature revealed that the Allied courage was formed by both
indifference to danger - through habit and routine - and positive motives, but
mostly by the former (Ambrose, 2001). The German courage is of greater
interest. Whilst certainly a result of habit, many soldiers had been in combat
since 1939, and built an endurance to fear through courage. The source of
the courage was through positive motives, most notably patriotism and their
deep belief in the rise of the Fatherland (Baldwin, 1981). However, Whiting
(1985) reveals an unusual source of courage; one that certainly does not
subsume itself under positive motives. His research exposed the already
commonly conjectured use of threats and internal fear as the motive for
courage; Whiting states that under the orders of Heinrich Himmler any
soldier “deserting to the enemy would be arrested and sent to a
concentration camp” (p. 56-57). In view of this information we could state
that courage formed from this source, was not natural and organic, but
fabricated. We are unable to statistically evaluate whether this had any
effect on the results, nonetheless it is important to mention.
It is here we must turn the discussion to Clausewitz’s concept of
‘friction’ as all the contending elements, such as weather, lack of
intelligence, and exhaustion, can be labelled as such. Friction is composed
of those aspects that interfere with the “effective application of force”
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(Clausewitz, 1993, p. 18). Friction is effectively the elements that prevent
action from going exactly according to plan. In simpler terms, as Clausewitz
succinctly describes it, friction is the elements that “distinguish real war
from war on paper” (p. 138). Friction caused major chaos during the
Ardennes Offensive, particularly as German military leaders were well
aware of its effect. Here is an example of how they utilised courage to create
friction for the Allied forces: on direct orders from Hitler, an operation to
support the Ardennes Offensive was initiated prior to the offensive’s
December 16 commencement. It was named Operation Greif and was under
the command of Major Otto Skorzeny (Weingartner, 1979, p. 191).
Skorzeny and 500 men of the 150th Panzer Brigade were to attempt to
infiltrate Allied lines by pretending to be American and British soldiers
(Ambrose, 2002, p. 189; Whiting, 1985, p. 8). They did so by wearing
stolen American and British uniforms, speaking fluent English, and wearing
dog tags stolen from those killed in action (Weingartner, 1979, p. 209). The
effect was immediate: fear spread quickly through the lines (Goolrick &
Tanner, 1979, p. 58). Operation Greif was an operation formed from
courage; courage was utilised at every step and was sourced from the
motivation of patriotism for the cause, and the longing for honour.
Knowingly conducting an operation that would most likely get one’s self
killed is a courageous action like no other. However, these men were not
simply on the offensive, moving towards physically and morally harming
the enemy; these soldiers were attempting to infiltrate Allied lines and
interact with their adversary in the attempt to create chaos, destroy
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communication lines, capture fuel dumps, and most importantly capture
bridges (Parker, 1997, p. 21). Utilising courage in this manner resulted in
the opposite of this moral force in Allied forces: fear. The effect of
Operation Greif was felt all through the Allied line. A game of cat and
mouse ensued in the attempt to find the imposters, taking valuable thought
away from defensive actions and slowing down operations as it became
mandatory for soldiers to prove their nationality by answering questions that
United States troops would recognise such as the name of certain United
States baseball players (Whiting, 1985, p. 9). Courage was therefore
exploited by German forces not just to inflict physical casualties, but to
effect moral forces in the same capacity.
Morale, termed ‘military spirit’ by Clausewitz, is the most widely
discussed moral force in warfare. Morale is commonly regarded as the
stimulus of a soldier’s strength which is shown by his ability to continue
with a high level of skilled fighting in constant danger. While the definition
of morale differs according to occupation, the one that will form the basis of
this analysis is defined by Clausewitz (1993) as “the troops’ national feeling
(enthusiasm, fanatical zeal, faith and general temper” (1993, p. 221). Morale
is important as it effects every aspect of warfare as the feeling on behalf of
one man generally effects the next until the ‘spirit of the whole’ is one.
Accordingly, it becomes the task of an army to not only inflict physical
casualties on its enemy, but to also reduce the enemy’s morale as this will
not only increase the physical casualties, it will limit the courageous actions
of its enemy, increase the likelihood of surrender, and in many cases, result

51

in the loss of confidence in military leaders (which will have its own
effects).
According to Clausewitz there are two sources of morale; continuous
success in engagements and the use of an army’s greatest strength (1993, p.
222) and, similar to most of his thinking, Clausewitz adds that they must
interact to produce morale. Through this thinking, the analysis revealed that
the source of morale for the Allies was indeed the continuous success they
had experienced since they became directly involved in World War II by the
invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944 (Forty, 2000, p. 83). Since then they
had continually been on the offensive; and had used every effort available to
them. It is easy to understand why those soldiers in the Ardennes, who were
either resting and refitting or replacements training to enter combat, were
“buoyed with success” and strongly believed they would be home by
Christmas (Hal C. Pattison cited in Cole, 1993, p. vii). Whiting (1985)
shows the unity of morale between the ranks, describing the national feeling
amongst the troops as ‘relaxed’ and the commanders ‘confident’ (p. 4, 33).
The morale among the German troops was described by Whiting as
‘nervous and tense’ (p. 88). The German Army had been on the defensive
for many months; however they continued to fight with all their power as
they “seemed to have found new strength and determination to resist”
(Forty, 2002, p. 30).
The Malmédy Massacre is an example of how far the attempt to destroy
the morale of the enemy during the Ardennes Offensive could go. In the
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texts focused the Ardennes Offensive, of which there are hundreds if not
thousands, nearly every one of them discusses the Malmédy Massacre
(Cole, 1965; Cooke & Evans, 2008; MacDonald, 1984). On the 17th
December, the second day of the offensive, the 1st Division SS
Panzergrenadiere Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler came across Battery B, 285th
Field Artillery Observation Battalion of the 7th Armoured Division of the
United States Army. Under the leadership of Jochen Peiper, 1st Division
rounded up the American soldiers they captured – who had surrendered and
were now Prisoners of War (POW) – and opened fire, killing approximately
84 troops. The following day the news reached all along the frontline and
the Supreme Headquarters (Weingartner, 1979, p. 65). The effect was
immediate: U.S. resolve and determination strengthened (Cole, p. 261;
Goolrick & Tanner, 1979, p. 57; Weingartner, 1979, pp. 1, 2). In the
framework of military theory, this terrible act of hostile aggression should
have reduced morale; it did the opposite. The general temper amongst U.S.
troops was full of anger and fury, but the effect was an increase in
motivation as “the news of the massacre acted as a stimulant to flagging
American resistance…” (Weingartner, 1979, p. 1) and those who may have
been contemplating surrender quickly gave up this option.
By taking the analysis further, into one of the main events of the
Ardennes Offensive, the degree in which moral forces determined the final
result becomes evident. On December 16, 1944, the German Army broke
through Allied frontlines across the Ardennes region. Of the three main
armies involved, the Fifth Panzer Army was selected to cover the left flank
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of the Sixth Panzer Army (Cole, 1965, p. 75). Hasso von Manteuffel’s Fifth
Panzer Army had multiple towns to capture in their drive to support the
Sixth Panzer Army’s objective of Antwerp; one of which was successfully
capturing the road-junction of Bastogne currently defended by elements of
the United States 28th Division, VIII Corps, First Army (Cirillo, 2003;
Marshall, 1988, p. 19; Toland, 1999, p. 20). The attack on Bastogne would
feature three divisions of the Fifth Panzer Army; the 2d Panzer to attack on
the right, the 26th Volksgrenadier Division on the left, and the Panzer Lehr
Division in reserve (Marshall, 1988, p. 179). On December 16, only one
U.S. Company was able to defend against the multiple German battalions
that began the attack in the Bastogne area. Following the breakthrough, VIII
Corps Commander Major General Troy Middleton was well aware of the
importance of the road-junctions to attacking movements (Cirillo, 2003;
Marshall, 1988, p. 19). Accordingly, he ordered troops to move towards
Bastogne to assist in its defense. Physical forces utilised through the tactic
of Blitzkrieg had its intended effect by creating disorder amongst the
defenders (Eisenhower, 1997, p. 354). Theoretically, with such a superiority
of numbers, German Forces should have completely overpowered the
enemy captured Bastogne and raced towards the Meuse River; however the
majority of the United States 28th division managed to hold out for at least
one day before withdrawing (Marshall, 1988, p. 6).
The United States 28th division were one of two veteran divisions in
the Ardennes, and were resting and refitting after fighting in the Huertgen
Forest (Lone Sentry, 1945); however they were still on the line. Thus,
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through Clausewitz’s theoretical perspective it can be ascertained that the
28th division were accustomed to combat and could rely on their habitual
courage to respond to the attack, whereas the emotional courage formed
from positive motives was negatively affected by the sheer physical force.
This was demonstrated by their ability to defend their area for the initial
days of the offensive before being forced to give up ground due to the sheer
physical force of the enemy. S. L. A. Marshall’s (1988) U.S. Army official
history of fighting in Bastogne during the offensive describes the state of
troops retreating as disordered. He adds that some wandered back to the
front line in their confusion but did not stay to defend (p. 73). The effect of
the overpowering physical forces utilised through Blitzkrieg was unable to
be matched by moral forces once disorder and fear settled in. However, the
28th’s defense was essential in preventing the three German divisions from
advancing further. If they had lacked courage due to inexperience in
combat, they may have retreated immediately which would have allowed
the German Army to race through to Antwerp before the Allies were able to
put up a staunch defense.
The effect of the breakthrough on moral forces was obvious to the
soldiers of the United States 101st Airborne division when they moved into
defend the area close to the town of Foy on December 19 to assist in the
defense of Bastogne (Ambrose, 2001, p. 179) following Combat Command
B of the 10th Armoured Division’s move to Bastogne the previous day.
Major Richard Winter, in one of several interviews with Ambrose (2001)
reported seeing the American soldiers defeat. Ambrose paraphrases Winters,
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“…down the middle of the road came the defeated American troops, fleeing
the front in disarray, moblike. Many had thrown away their rifles, their
coats, all encumbrances. Some were in a panic, staggering, exhausted,
shouting, ‘Run! Run! They’ll murder you! They’ll kill you! They’ve got
everything, tanks, machine-guns, air power, everything!’” (p. 174?)
Fortunately for the American Army, those on the receiving end of such a
site were the veterans of the 101st Airborne Division (Burgett, 1967, p. 199)
To those with little experience in warfare or with a lack of positive motives,
the site of thousands of men fleeing from the direction in which they were
moving towards would have undoubtedly shaken their courage and unsettled
their morale, yet Winters, as well as the thousands of other troops, marched
forward with little information and little preparation. Winters felt ashamed
by the display, stating, “They were just babbling…it was pathetic”
(Ambrose, 2001, p. 176).
World War II historian, Stephen E. Ambrose’s (2001) extensive
research into the United States Army provides a background that gives an
interesting take to the utilisation of courage by United States forces:
It was the policy of the U.S. Army to keep its rifle companies on
the line for long periods…making up losses by individual
replacement. This meant that replacements went into combat
now not with the men they had trained and shipped overseas
with, but with strangers. It also meant that the veteran could
look forward to a release from the dangers threatening him only
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through death or serious wound. This created a situation of
endlessness and hopelessness… (p. 202)
Of the four divisions in the Ardennes, two were green units who had little
experience, and the remaining two were being refitted for replacements.
What this essentially means is the replacements in the Ardennes on
December 16 were not surrounded by men they had complete trust in as
they were unable to build such a relationship with the veterans who had
trained, fought and felt fear together for many years. Furthermore, they
simply did not have the experience of combat and had not built an
indifference to danger. Brian Drohan (2006) in his exploration of
Clausewitz’s moral forces logically considers courage and morale to be
linked to motivation (p. 304). This is certainly the impression given by the
negative effect of the breakthrough on the courage and morale of the
retreating divisions as the retreating men also eagerly gave the men of the
101st Division their ammunition, symbolically releasing “…themselves of
any further obligation to stand and fight” (Ambrose, 2001, p. 176-177).
From this point forward, it became less about physical numbers and
more about utilising moral forces. Considering the conditions, the offensive
was bound to become a psychological battle. The Supreme Commander of
the Allied Forces, General Eisenhower’s intellect and skill as a military
leader was most evident during the first few days of the offensive. Utilising
airborne divisions such as the 82d and 101st was certainly a strategic move,
not simply because of their experience and the recognition of the knowledge
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of their ability, but because of the moral forces that result from these. Both
divisions had experienced almost constant fighting against German forces
since the invasion of Normandy (Ambrose, 2001; 2002; Cole, 1965).
Therefore, the courage utilised in the Ardennes was largely due to habit,
these men were not unaccustomed to the chaos they were suddenly thrown
into. The 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions were notified on 17 December,
the second day of the offensive, that German forces had broken the line and
they were to be moved out immediately but little else was known (Cole,
1965). Just two days following the 101st’s arrival in Bastogne they were
completely encircled by German forces but had set up a strong defense. The
Division had little medical supplies, little food, no proper winter clothing,
and as the Division Commander, Major General Taylor, was not with the
Division, no higher-level military leadership.
While the utilisation of experienced Allied combat soldiers was a
tactical move due to their experience and recognised combat ability, the
German Army was statistically undertrained across the board (Dupuy, et al.,
1994). Sixth Panzer Army commander, Josef Dietrich, describes the 1944
state of training of his troops as ‘medium’ as 60% of the combat elements
had less than six to eight weeks training (Parker, 1997, p. 16). He adds that
replacements were from other non-army elements or young and old men
new to the army (MacDonald, 1984, p. 37). This is consistent with the Fifth
Panzer Army who relied on the 26th Volksgrenadier Division to form the
first attack. These Volksgrenadier divisions were formed in 1944
specifically for this offensive and primarily consisted of those that had
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previously been exempt from conscription due to age, disability or homefront purposes. Cirillo (2003, p. 19) and Cole (1965, p. 9) agree with this
assessment, stating that Hitler’s obsession with numbers was to
overcompensate for the lack of training. Employing the 26th Volksgrenadier
division as the first attacking division was a tactical move as infantry is
considered by most military theorists, including Clausewitz (1993), to be
most effective in the first stages due the ability to move quickly and quietly,
unlike panzer armies. Von Manteuffel’s utilisation of the

26th

Volksgrenadier division was effective in terms of tactics relating to physical
forces, such as superiority of numbers. This is evident by their ability to
make an opening against the U.S. 28th division, allowing the two panzer
divisions to move past and race for the Meuse River which made good
progress in the initial days (Lone Sentry, 1945; Shapiro, 1976, p. 142).
However, following the movement of the 101st Airborne Division to the
area the moral forces became a greater influence on the offensive due to the
sources of courage. The newly formed German 26th Volksgrenadier
Division did not have the habitual courage resulting from experience
(Kleemeier, 2007, p. 115) and whilst patriotic, most soldiers involved in the
offensive did not understand the move to the west at all. Stephen E.
Ambrose (2002) explains the situation:
For the Germans, their physical misery was exacerbated by the
terrible thought that what they were doing was the absolute
worst thing they could do for their country and the German
people. As Lt. Walter Rahn of the 11th Panzer Division put it,
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‘Why were we holding up the Americans in the west and
allowing the Russians to penetrate Germany? It was senseless
what we were doing there, fighting the Americans.’ (p. 383)
Regardless of the troop’s patriotism, the average soldier’s inability to
understand the move to the west undoubtedly would have affected both
courage and morale. This is supported by Lieutenant Colonel John W.
Appel and Captain Gilbert W. Beene’s research on the psychological effects
of combat in “Preventative Psychiatry: An Epidemiologic Approach” who
assert that “group morale was improved when soldiers were given clear
reasons for the importance of engaging in specific combat operations” (cited
in Wanke, 1999, pp. 133-134). Without understanding the move to the west,
German soldiers were unable to keep the morale high, particularly as the
defense strengthened.
From 21st December to 26th December the 101st Airborne Division,
along with elements of the 10th Armoured Division, the 705th Tank
Destroyer Battalion and 755th Armoured Field Artillery, were completely
surrounded in what is now known as the Siege of Bastogne. During this
period, the moral forces played an important part in delaying German
attacks. It is evident that there was a large physical disadvantage to Allied
forces as they totalled approximately 11,000 men (Ethier, 2009; Murphy,
2014) against the 45,000 men of the 26th Volksgrenadier Division, 2d
Panzer Division and Panzer Lehr Division (Shapiro, 1976, p. 142). Not only
were the physical forces inferior, the Allies were contending with a
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multitude of frictional elements. The German divisions were charged with
breaking through the Allied line and exploiting this friction. Due to the
winter weather conditions (a frictional element) the Allies were unable to be
resupplied by air meaning they had only the little supplies they entered
Bastogne with.
However, as evident in the literature they understood the mental ability
needed to not only survive the action, but to take well thought-out bold,
courageous actions for the benefit of themselves and their fellow soldiers
(Ambrose, 2001; 2002). They had trust in one another formed from
experiencing some of the most difficult situations imaginable. It is also
important to note that the Airborne Divisions were paratroopers, and thus
used to being surrounded (Marshall, 1988, p. 135). It is evident that the
troops in the Ardennes from the 21st to the 26th December 1944 relied on
moral forces until the physical forces were able to be increased. One man of
the 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne contributes the
trust gained from long periods of combat for the ability to utilise courage to
persist in the face of danger during the offensive:
We weren’t particularly elated at being here. Rumours are the
Krauts are everywhere and hitting hard. Farthest from your mind
is the thought of falling back. In fact it isn’t there at all. And so
you dig your hole carefully and deep, and wait, for that mythical
superman, but for the enemy you had beaten twice before and
will again. You look first to the left, then right, at your buddies
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also preparing. You feel confident with Bill over there. You
know you can depend on him. (Ambrose, 2001, p. 178)
There are three points of interest in this quote. The first, the use of the
words, “you know you can depend”, demonstrating that the relationships
built in combat were essential to positive morale. The utilisation of veteran
soldiers by the United States in the Ardennes Offensive was a strategic
move that, the literature suggests, assisted in German defeat and the failing
of the Ardennes Offensive (Cole, 1965; Dupuy, et al., 1994). The second
point: the soldier’s words, “farthest from your mind is the thought of falling
back”; demonstrating the courage was a result of habit. Finally, the rumours
that circulated; rumours are the perfect example of friction at work during
the offensive. Clausewitz states that friction always has an effect on moral
forces; however moral forces also combat friction. Friction in the Ardennes
Offensive was almost all against the Allied forces; however their moral
forces were able to prevent friction from greatly affecting their ability for
successful action.
Various events within the six day siege had a positive effect on the
courage and morale of Allied troops. Firstly, on December 22nd, a small
number of German troops entered Bastogne demanding the Allies to
surrender. The 101st Division’s commanding officer reply of “Nuts!”
became famous across the entire front (Cole, 1965; Ethier, 2009). The
absolute refusal for withdrawal by the commanding officer in the area
increased morale as it became clear that those in high command had belief
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in Allied success. Secondly, on December 23rd, the weather that the
Germans were so dependent on to deny Allied forces use of their air support
cleared allowing U.S. air men to drop essential supplies to attack German
tanks and infantry from the air (Marshall, 1988; Murphy, 2014). While the
supplies were still not adequate for the circumstances, and the weather
quickly turned against the Allies once again, it greatly increased morale
among the troops.
On December 26th, 1944, the siege was broken when elements of
General Patton’s Third Army fought their way through the Fifth Panzer
Army’s encirclement (Ethier, 2009). The addition of the Third Army in the
area decreased the German superiority in physical forces which was
followed by an Allied counteroffensive, pushing German forces back behind
the Siegfried Line. However, during the six day siege the Allies relied on
their moral forces to defend the area until the physical forces were able to
equal the German Army’s, this was also the case in many other situations
during the offensive.
The effect of moral forces on the offensive overall is evident by the fact
that the Fifth Panzer Army’s advance was by far the most successful of the
three main armies involved, even though their advance was slight (Cole,
1965, p. 135). An initial four U.S divisions against the Germans thirteen
infantry divisions, seven panzer divisions, and two panzer brigades
demonstrates that moral forces across the entire front were strong enough to
form a successful defense until their physical forces could be increased. The
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Sixth Panzer Army were stopped before the Our River (MacDonald, 1984,
p. 588) and the Seventh Army achieved only slight penetrations, with most
divisions failing to break through the initial defense (Cirillo, 2003, p. 18).
The speed of troop movement in the initial stage of the offensive is evidence
of the high morale amongst German troops, however as soon as Allied
defense thwarted any significant progress moral forces decreased which is
also evident by the lack of objectives seized (Parker, 1997, p. 79). Each day
the Germans fell behind their timetable, their morale and courage decreased.
However, it was not until January 22, 1945 that Hitler allowed complete
withdrawal from the Ardennes with the conclusion of the offensive on
January 25 (MacDonald, 1993, p. 26). According to Clausewitz (1993), the
loss of what little ground the Germans gained during the five week period
demonstrates the loss of morale (p. 273). While the courage and morale of
the German and Allied armies was crucial to the outcome, the last element
of moral forces, military leadership, will require further examination due to
its effect on all aspects of the offensive.
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Chapter Five
Military Leadership in the Ardennes

Chapter Three and Chapter Four have explored the utilisation and
effects of physical and moral forces in the Ardennes Offensive. However,
one aspect of moral forces has been separated from its counterparts for a
stronger analysis – military leadership. In his 1832 text, On War, Carl von
Clausewitz (1993) informs the reader on the concept of moral forces of
which the first and most important element is military leadership. The
military leaders chosen for discussion of this form of moral force either,
demonstrate the characteristics outlined by Clausewitz, thus aligning with
his theory on military genius, or oppose the characteristics but remain in a
position of power within their country’s armed forces. Either way, military
leaders have a great effect on their own, and their adversaries, utilisation
and effects of physical and moral forces.
In the chaos and danger that characterises war it is often the mind of
one man that is forced to put the situation and its elements into perspective.
Although all soldiers are forced into such circumstances, and those of lower
ranks often in more danger due to their proximity to the front, it is a
commander’s responsibility to make the critically important decisions in
times of danger. Accordingly, military action must be supported by the
appropriate military leadership. According to Clausewitz (1993), a military
commander must have certain characteristics: a skilled judgement, sense of
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intuition (and the ability to follow this intuition), courage, and determination
are but some of the characteristics that compose a skilled commander. It is
the combination of these characteristics that constitute the paradigmatic
commander. An outstanding form of military leadership is more rare. Ulrike
Kleemeier in his text, Moral Forces in War (2007), elucidates on this
concept. As mentioned, the combination of the characteristics of the ideal
commander is necessary. These characteristics are listed under the terms
‘rational’ and/or ‘emotional’ (p. 110). It is the harmony of the rational and
emotional aspect of man’s personality that when revealed - in this case in
warfare - in extraordinary circumstances and successes that the military
leader is termed a ‘military genius’ (Clausewitz, 1993, p. 115; Kleemeier,
2007, p. 111).
To begin, Dupuy et al. (1994, p. 369) makes an important point
regarding the convoluted structure of the German High Command. This
must be noted as Adolf Hitler, as Führer of Germany and its occupied
territories, was in theory the equal of American president, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, and should require no discussion in regards to the Ardennes
Offensive. However, Hitler had direct control over both the planning and
execution of the offensive and therefore will be referred to as the equal, in a
military capacity, to the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied
Expeditionary Force, Dwight D. Eisenhower.
As outlined in Clausewitz’s moral forces theory, the ability for great
actions results from the relationship between reason and passion
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(Kleemeier, 2007). This relationship is linked by will power which has both
rational and emotional characteristics and, as such, the harmony of both may
produce extraordinary feats (Clausewitz, 1993, p. 115). While Hitler’s goal
for the Third Reich could be considered a passion (a ‘long-term emotion’),
his sudden want for Antwerp was not, as it was an impulsive decision that
was merely a pathway to the ultimate objective (Kleemeier, 2007, pp. 112,
113). As “passions can combine with reason in a way spontaneous feelings
cannot”, Hitler was unable to utilise the aptitude of will power (intellect) in
guiding the spontaneous want for Antwerp (p. 112). It was Hitler’s passion
that determined his longing for honour and renown – regarded by
Clausewitz as the most powerful of all passions – which he believed the
success of the offensive would result, as it would be a step closer to
Germany’s rise (Clausewitz, 1993, p. 121). However, it was his lack of
reason or rational thinking that determined the route. The literature on the
Ardennes agrees that the failure in the initial planning stages of the
offensive was a factor that largely contributed to its downfall (Cole, 1965).
The decision to place Antwerp (a port north of the Ardennes) as the
objective was entirely Hitler’s decision – and one with many opponents It
was not rational to base a plan on the success of a previous offensive (the
1940 invasion of France), considering the Allies were now fully aware of
German tactics in terms of Blitzkrieg, the United States Army situated in the
Ardennes was of much higher calibre than the French Army in 1940, and
the winter weather conditions being almost completely opposite of those of
the 1940 offensive (Cirillo, 2003). However, as Hitler’s mind was clearly
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unbalanced in terms of rational and emotional harmony, with emotion being
the dominant element, the result was failure. His insistence on having total
control over the German armed forces resulted in the ineffective utilisation
of military leadership in its highest capacity.
Hitler made the momentous decision to launch a major offensive during
one of his daily morning meetings in September 1944 with his military
advisors, General Jodl and General Keitel in attendance (Toland, 1999).
Three Armies would be involved, two of those being SS Armies; the Sixth
Panzer Army led by General Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich, the Fifth Panzer Army
led by General Hasson von Manteuffel and the Fifteenth Army led by
General Erich Brandenberger (Cole, 1965). Both Jodl and Keitel produced
several alternate plans to the Führer as after analysing the logistical situation
both Generals were well aware of its failings, only some of which included
Germany’s failing situation in the East requiring the bulk of material and
manpower, the lack of fuel and ammunition available, and the need to rely
on aspects that were unreliable such as the slow reaction from Allied
leadership to the offensive (Forty, 2002, p. 42-43). All plans were rejected.
The literature supports the view that the utilisation of Clausewitz’s concept
of judgment in Hitler’s examination of the alternative options was almost
non-existent (Cole, 1965; Forty, 2000; MacDonald, 1984). The planning
stage of the execution was not supported by the intellect needed to provide
structure to Hitler’s impulsive emotions; thus once again there was a
dominant emotional element, without the rational to provide support.
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Danny S. Parker’s text, Hitler’s Ardennes Offensive: The German View
of the Battle of the Bulge (1997), provides an invaluable source to support
this assessment of Hitler’s lack of logical judgment. Parker has compiled the
most important collection of interviews and essays comprising all of the key
members of the German command, excluding Hitler. These interviews and
essays were conducted just months following the conclusion of World War
II as a program initiated by the European Theater of Operations (ETO)
Historical Section. Each interview was conducted separately and all three
Army Generals, Dietrich, von Manteuffel and Brandenberger criticise
Hitler’s military advisors for supporting Hitler’s delusions. General von
Manteuffel of the Fifth Panzer Army remarks on Jodl’s lack of experience
in war (Parker, 1997, p. 232); his opinion on Keitel was just as bad. The
books editor, Parker (1997), agrees with von Manteuffel’s assessment of
Keitel stating, “What Hitler saw in Keitel was an unthinking assistant who
would blindly obey his bidding…” His lack of “imagination or intellectual
power…” was evident (p. 232). General Dietrich of the Sixth Panzer Army
which was tasked with the main thrust through the Ardennes adds, “They
[Jodl and Keitel] only waged war…on maps” (p. 234). The utilisation of
military leadership in this regard was another flawed element that had
devastating effects. It is evident that Hitler abused his military leadership
position to surround himself by those who would provide advice but
ultimately submit to his judgments.
It was not until just days before the December 16 offensive was set to
begin that all of the Generals who were to be involved became privy to the
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plan. Consequently, Hitler’s method of military leadership had a run-on
effect that affected the Generals who were to lead the offensive. His
paranoia in keeping the details of the offensive a secret prevented his Army
Generals from having the appropriate time to plan or counsel their division
commanders as General Dietrich of the Sixth Panzer Army declares, “I
should have been given four weeks of planning instead of four days. I was
not in the area even once before the attack, and I couldn’t look at the terrain.
I didn’t have time to prepare my thoughts and ideas in the way they really
should have been prepared” (cited in Parker, 1997, p. 28). He bravely
admitted his doubts directly to Hitler following the meeting, “I told Hitler
that I wasn’t ready to attack with my Army and that we didn’t have the
ammunition or fuel to carry it through successfully. The generals were all in
a line waiting to speak to Hitler and I had only a minute to tell him…He
said that I would have all I needed” (cited in Parker, 1997, p. 18). Parker
(1997) states that by 1944 German military leadership was “merely a
mechanical commanding body” (p. 147), suggesting that they were just
puppets without any ability for individual thought and action. The army
commanders, Dietrich, von Manteuffel and Brandenberger were to rely on
the decisions made by inexperienced men who far from understood the
actual situation at the front. Their efforts in altering the plan were rejected;
it appeared they had the individual thoughts and judgement but were not
expected to actually display this. A statement by Dietrich expressing his
disdain for the final plan supports this assessment, “This winter offensive, in
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my opinion, was the worst prepared German offensive of this war” (cited in
Parker, 1997, p. 30).
Hitler’s strict control over the offensive left the Commander in Chief
West, General Gerd von Rundstedt in an odd position. Technically, von
Rundstedt should have been the man to control the offensive, yet he had
little involvement choosing to allow Army Group B commander, General
Model the little control that Hitler offered (Hart, 1983, p. 444). Cole (1965)
emphasises the lack of control given, stating, “Instructions issued by Hitler
for the conduct of operations were in such detail that field commanders of
the stature of [von] Rundstedt and Model lacked the authority to move units
as small as divisions” (p. 31). The question can then be asked as to what
Hitler’s reasoning was for von Rundstedt’s employment. A study of the
literature revealed several interesting points of explanation. Von Rundstedt
had only recently, as of September 1944, been recalled to his position,
previously being dismissed according to MacDonald (1984) for minor
suggests of withdrawal (p. 21). Zabecki (1999) states that von Rundstedt
was well-respected by the Allies (p. 481). He was therefore to be the
‘figurehead’ which was ultimately a tactic to persuade the Allies that the
war in Europe onwards would be based on appropriate military strategies
which was effective as it contributed to the Allies surprise of the December
16 breakthrough (MacDonald, 1984, p. 34).
The Ardennes Offensive began on December 16, 1944 with an hour
long bombardment of infantry along the one hundred kilometre front. Chaos
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and fear quickly spread through Allied lines and according to highly
regarded historian Stephen Ambrose (2002), a “breakdown of discipline”
ensued (p. 204). It was here that the Supreme Commander of the Allied
Forces, General Eisenhower was responsible for “…the critical decisions of
the entire battle…” by his immediate direction of the 82d and 101st
Airborne Divisions to move into the Ardennes (Ambrose, 2001, p. 174).
Both divisions were refitting following the failure of Operation Market
Garden (Cole, 1965). The use of these divisions – the strategic reserves for
the entire Northwest – was not a decision to make lightly. Yet,
Eisenhower’s determination, another element of military genius, ensured not
only the divisions, but vehicles and material immediately began the move to
the Ardennes. Hitler’s assumption that Eisenhower would take several days
to even understand the offensive was one of major proportions was
immediately thwarted as Eisenhower’s skill as a military leader became
evident. Historians, Dupuy et al. (1994), Forty (2000), and MacDonald
(1984) agree that Eisenhower’s reaction to the breakthrough was critical to
Allied success. This factor was also mentioned in almost all interviews
conducted by Parker (1997). The effect of this was the saving of thousands
of lives and potentially prevented German forces from gaining back ground
and lengthening the war.
Eisenhower’s decision relates to Clausewitz’s use of judgment and
intuition titled coup d’oeil. Kleemeier (2007) describes it as “truth [being]
felt rather than deduced” (p. 113). The critical decision was a result of
Eisenhower’s ability to realise the importance of the December 16
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breakthrough with no military intelligence to support this feeling (Parker,
1997, p. 141). No other decision during the Ardennes Offensive displays the
utilisation of this characteristic to such a great extent. It is a textbook
example of intuition leading military action as “action can never be based
on anything firmer than instinct, a sensing of the truth” (Clausewitz, 1993,
p. 125). Considering the lack of military intelligence, aerial reconnaissance,
and little organised front-line reports to support this intuitive feeling, his
boldness in taking action is a considerable feat and one in which
undoubtedly effected the rest of the offensive as it denied the Germans the
time, and the frictions, they were relying upon to make a major
breakthrough, and greatly affected their timetable.
Once Eisenhower had given general strategies for the defense against
German Forces, it was up to the army group commanders to initiate these
orders. In Chapter Three, the discussion centred on the utilisation and
effects of physical forces. It was concluded that a key effect was General
Montgomery being given temporary command of all Allied forces north of
Bastogne on December 20, the fourth day of the offensive (Eisenhower, p.
355; MacDonald, 1993, p. 4). Eisenhower in his memoir, Crusade in
Europe (1997), stresses the positive effect of Montgomery’s command on
the northern area as control and communication between armies was able to
stay open which would have been difficult without this changeover as
General Bradley was situated in his headquarters south of the Ardennes and
unable to make contact with two of his armies whilst simultaneously
executing a counterattack from the south (Cirillo, 2003, p. 29; Eisenhower,
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1997, pp. 355-356; Smith, 2014). However, the analysis suggests that
Eisenhower’s employment of Montgomery as sole ground commander was
to ensure the Allied military system and public, as well as the German high
command recognized that Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary
Force (SHAEF) was committed to the Allied coalition (Morelock, 1994;
Smith, 2014).
While, Montgomery may have calmed the situation, the effect of the
changeover on the planned counterattack was disastrous. The literature
largely agrees that Montgomery’s ambition was to obtain command of allied
forces and lead the final drive into the political heart of Germany - Berlin.
This goal was partly to end the war under British command – almost in
opposition to Eisenhower’s staunch coalition based war. Once command
was achieved, Montgomery became over-cautious; we may assume as a
result of not wanting to make errors and either lose command or the public’s
perception. Following the breakthrough, SHAEF immediately began
planning for a counteroffensive to push German forces back behind the
West Wall or as the Germans titled it, the Siegfried Line. Montgomery’s
lack of boldness and bad judgment – unwanted characteristics in a
commander – prevented him from initiating his part of the counteroffensive
in a timely manner. Clausewitz’s (1993) statement that “boldness grows less
common in the higher ranks as [commanders] become governed by intellect
but must obey orders” (p. 221, 224) was accurate in Montgomery’s case. He
lacked the boldness required for such a role; however, interestingly he went
against the orders from his superior. Morelock (1994) outlines his
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explanations for the delay, ranging from Germany having reserves the Allies
were unaware of to Allied troops being too shocked to effectively form a
counteroffensive (p. 67). Consequently, whilst General Patton initiated the
Third Army’s part of the counteroffensive on December 23rd, Montgomery
delayed his First Army’s role until January 3rd (Ambrose, 1990). The issue
was that by the time the attack had progressed Hitler had slowly succumbed
to von Manteuffel’s insistence on withdrawal which affected the Allies
efforts to destroy as many German troops and equipment as possible
(MacDonald, 1993, p. 26).
Montgomery’s ambition, or passion, had overridden any reason.
Morelock (1994) states:
Monty was so preoccupied with gaining approval of his single
thrust offensive in the north (and receiving overall command of
Allied

ground

forces)

that

he

treated

the

Ardennes

counteroffensive as a sideshow, to be finished with the least
possible effort and expenditure of resources, thereby not
detracting from his real priority – the final campaign into
Germany. (p. 74)
This affected not only the counteroffensive itself, but the eventual drive into
Germany. The main reason for the counteroffensive to be initiated swiftly
was to destroy as many German forces as possible that would be used in the
defense of the Reich (Eisenhower, p. 363). If Montgomery had initiated his
part earlier and pushed south to link with Patton’s Third Army the war may
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have ended long before it actually did. The destructive effects of
Montgomery’s control was evident when following the linkup of the two
armies on January 16, the following day the First Army was returned to
Bradley’s control (Morelock, p. 127). Montgomery’s lack of boldness, bad
judgement and his determination for British fame resulted in him fabricating
the truth to the public and press of his influence (Ambrose, 1990, p. 180;
Brighton, 2008; Zaloga, 2010) yet the analyses conclusion is clear:
Montgomery’s leadership had a negative effect on the Allied role in the
Ardennes Offensive.
Thus far the analysis of military leadership in the Ardennes
Offensive has been varied as to the success of decisions, actions and overall
command. However, as we turn to army level we can see a definitive
increase in successful decisions made purely by the commander’s military
understanding and psychological strength. With varying degrees of training,
development and experiences in war, we can only conclude that in this
instance Clausewitz’s (1993) notion that the further one goes down in
command, the more boldness and individualism increase is accurate (p.
221). This is particularly true when analysing Lieutenant General George S.
Patton’s influence on the offensive. As commander of the United States
Third Army, Patton was well renowned within the military and on the home
front which the literature suggests was a large motivation for him
(Blumenson, 1985, p. 223). As stated earlier, Clausewitz describes renown
and honour as the most powerful of all passions, providing “the ambition to
strive higher than the rest, as he must if he is to distinguish himself” (p. 121-
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122). It was this ambition that produced Patton’s great actions that had
direct effects on Allied success in the Ardennes.
The employment of Patton as Third Army commander had a positive
effect on the outcome of the Ardennes Offensive for Allied Forces. Whilst
the literature agrees that the December 16 breakthrough was a complete
surprise to SHAEF, various historians (Dupuy et al., p. 11; MacDonald,
1984, p. 75; Morelock, p. 203) including Patton scholar, Martin Blumenson,
who dedicated much of his academic career studying the army commander
and produced such texts as, Patton, the Man Behind the Legend, 1885-1945
(1985), states that Patton was concerned about the lightly defended
Ardennes long before the attack began as evident in his diary which directly
relates to Clausewitz’s idea of intuitively based action. His intuitive thought
alone was not remarkable; his actions based upon his intuition were.
Clausewitz (1993) states that “war is the realm of uncertainty…” (p. 117)
which requires one to have two qualities coup d’oeil defined as intuition and
judgement, and determination, the ability to take action on the intuitive
thought (p. 117). Patton perceiving the Ardennes as a potential opportunity
for the enemy demonstrates Clausewitz’s first quality. The truly remarkable
aspect lies in his actions in combatting this concern. Firstly, early in
December Patton advised his staff to begin developing plans in case of a
breakthrough as the Ardennes was situated on his Army’s north flank.
Secondly, following the breakthrough he began moving numerous divisions,
consisting of thousands of troops into a northward facing position in the
event he receive an order to counterattack (Patton & Harkins, 1995). It must
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be mentioned that the Allies were preparing for their own offensive to begin
on December 19, 1944. As such, Patton’s determination in following his
intuition is even more impressive. The effect of Patton’s intuition and
correct judgement can be seen in his next action.
Following the December 16 breakthrough SHAEF staff held a
meeting at Verdun to discuss how to counterattack, which was also attended
by army group and army level Generals (Patton & Harkins, 1995). It was
here that, once again, Patton demonstrated his skilled leadership. Among the
various issues since the breakthrough, the town of Bastogne had been under
siege with the 101st Airborne Division and elements of the 10th Armoured
Division in its centre. Patton’s response to the situation was to inform those
in attendance that on December 23 three of his divisions could begin
moving north towards Bastogne with three divisions to follow later
(Blumenson, 1985, p. 246, 247; Patton & Harkins, 1995, p. 330). Historians
such as Ambrose (2002), Blumenson (1985), and Dupuy et al. (1994) all
describe Eisenhower’s shock and uncertainty at the possibility of such an
action, even though interestingly Eisenhower (1997) does not comment on
this in his own memoir. Third Army movement went ahead towards
Bastogne and on December 26, just three days following the first stage of
movement, the siege was broken with Morelock (1994) describing the
action as “masterfully executed” (p. 130). Additional evidence to Patton’s
skill as an army commander lies in a point Morelock makes that 12th Army
Group commander General Bradley, Patton’s superior, should have been the
one to plan and command this action (p. 130). The fact that these divisions
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had moved so quickly over one hundred miles not only demonstrates
Patton’s leadership skills, it also demonstrates the high rate of morale as
they were able to overcome the obstacles that delayed the German Army in
their own advance (Kirkpatrick, 1992). The Allies, in their initial defense
then relief of Bastogne, had successfully prevented German forces from
achieving a crucial military objective which slowed the German drive to
Antwerp and contributed to General von Manteuffel’s assessment that the
German offensive could no longer reach the objective (Cirillo, 2003, p. 26;
Cole, 1965; MacDonald, 1993, p. 23).
The utilisation of General Patton’s skilled leadership successfully
relieved Bastogne. Whilst Stephen Ambrose, in his 2001 book, Band of
Brothers, which follows the United States Easy Company of the 506th
Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division who were involved in the siege
of Bastogne, states that none involved have ever admitted they needed “to
be rescued” (p. 191) it is not certain as to what may have transpired if
Patton’s Army had not broken the siege. A study of the literature and the
major events, decisions and actions that transpired over the five week period
concludes that Patton’s leadership displayed the most characteristics
outlined by Clausewitz for the ideal military leader amongst Allied generals
as he demonstrated intuition, judgement, boldness and determination that
greatly affected the Ardennes Offensive by contributing to the staunch
defense at Bastogne and the counteroffensive. This was not the conclusion
from one action but from multiple that often occurred consecutively.
Although the other generals did display these characteristics, they were
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often displayed in isolated incidents and did not encompass the combination
of Clausewitz’s characteristics.
Fifth Panzer Army commander, General von Manteuffel was one of the
opposite army commanders to Patton, but the only one who was an equal in
terms of skill. From the planning stages of the offensive, von Manteuffel
demonstrated professional ability. Hitler trusted this ability which resulted
in von Manteuffel convincing Hitler to alter various aspects of the plan; the
first being to begin the attack with infantry followed by a broad front panzer
attack, and to begin at 5:30am to take advantage of the daylight (Cole, 1965,
p. 173; Goolrick & Tanner, 1979, p. 86; Mellenthin, 1977, p. 243). Whilst
not managing to make major changes, these tactical changes were an
improvement. However, it was during the execution of the offensive that
von Manteuffel’s skill, particularly his boldness, was unmistakeable. Whilst
Dietrich and Brandenberger were quickly halted by U.S. defense, von
Manteuffel managed to quickly breakthrough the Allied line, in part because
he had covertly altered the Fifth Panzer Army’s plan according to the terrain
as he sent forth assault detachments to begin the attack (Mellenthin, 1977, p.
244).
Following the staunch U.S. defense at Bastogne, von Manteuffel made
the decision to instead focus his panzer divisions on reaching the Meuse
River as U.S. defenders would still be under siege from his infantry
divisions until Patton’s Army could make contact from the south (Cirillo,
2003, p. 26). His boldness in doing so appears to go against Clausewitz’s
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(1993) idea of obedience, as the theorist states “only when boldness rebels
against obedience, when it defiantly ignores an express command, must it be
treated as a dangerous offensive…” (p. 224). At first glance, Clausewitz’s
statement seems quite contradictory within the whole, however we must
remember that his idea of obedience stems from the standpoint that in
theory the superior will allow for independent thought on all levels. The
commander must be given a broad plan which allows for individual decision
making to counter frictional elements that are unforeseeable (Kleemeier,
2007, p. 116-117). So, we could state that von Manteuffel’s deviation from
his orders was merely adapting to actual conditions and elements. These
deviations resulted in greater success as the Fifth Panzer Army became the
main attacking army with elements getting close to the preliminary
objective of reaching the Meuse River in comparison to Dietrich and
Brandenberger who strictly obeyed their orders and did not manage to
advance against the initial U.S defense (Cirillo, 2003, p. 18). Once Patton’s
Army was involved, it became clear to von Manteuffel that withdrawal was
the only option. After many failed attempts, he managed to convince Hitler
and saved thousands of troops, equipment and materiel from destruction
which was then able to be used in the final defense of the Reich. Mellenthin
(1977) agrees that von Manteuffel’s performance was the greatest of the
German generals in the field which we can attribute to his display of good
judgement, boldness, and determination which Dupuy et al. (1994) goes so
far as to state that he “seems to have had at least a touch of genius…” (p.
369-370). Regardless of his total disbelief in the offensive, he did
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everything in his power to achieve success. The utilisation of von
Manteuffel as an army commander was Hitler’s greatest achievement in the
Ardennes Offensive.
This chapter has demonstrated that the German commanders did not
effectively utilise their positions as military leaders due to their inability to
employ their own initiative and judgement. The effect was disastrous; they
were unable to make even the most minor decisions without permission
from Hitler himself, wasting precious time for Allied leaders to utilise their
skill, regroup, and make effective decisions that quickly turned the offensive
in their favour. Military leadership as under Clausewitz’s concept of moral
forces titled ‘skill of the commander’ had the largest impact on determining
the outcome of the Ardennes Offensive as it effected the utilisation of both
physical and the remaining moral forces.
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Conclusion

This thesis provided a re-interpretation of World War II’s 1944-1945
Ardennes Offensive by utilising the theoretical perspective of Carl von
Clausewitz according to his military text On War, published in 1832. This
perspective aimed to provide an explanation as to why such an initial
physical superiority failed to produce success for German forces.
Clausewitz’s theory on moral forces was chosen as it has not previously
been applied to the offensive, as the majority of the literature on the
offensive simply provide an examination of the physical forces, thus, this
thesis provides a different re-interpretation of the final result. By taking the
Clausewitzian terms and concepts of physical and moral forces and placing
them in the context of a twentieth century period of military and political
action this thesis reveals the importance of moral forces in warfare. This
thesis aimed to answer three research questions:
1. Using Clausewitzian theory, what does an analysis of World
War II’s 1944 Ardennes Offensive reveal about the utilisation
and effects of physical and moral forces?
2. To what degree was the Ardennes Offensive determined through
physical or moral forces?
3. What were the main events, operations or situations that
effected moral forces?
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To do so, this thesis was broken down into three topics: physical forces,
moral forces, and military leadership.
The analysis reveals that the German Forces effectively utilised their
physical forces by employing Clausewitz’s concept of the maximum use of
force through speed and surprise, however, the strategy (a result of
ineffective military leadership) did not accurately account for the lack of
fuel and influence of terrain on such a large number of forces. This resulted
in clogged roads which prevented a swift attack. Allied Forces were then
able to regroup, reorganise and move forces to the Ardennes and set up a
staunch defense. The initial physical superiority garnered slow results,
nowhere near the level expected. It is clear that physical forces were not
effectively utilised due to ineffective planning, thus the planning stages of
the offensive were crucial to its failure.
The utilisation of moral forces in the Ardennes Offensive was most
evident during the Siege of Bastogne from December 21 to December 26.
During this operation the Allies managed to utilise their moral forces to
produce a staunch defense which prevented German Forces from moving
towards the port of Antwerp to assist in its capture. The analysis revealed
that both Allied and German Armies had replacements and new divisions,
however the German Army employed many Volksgrenadier Divisions in
main roles. While this was effective in terms of physical superiority, as soon
as the physical superiority was reduced the moral forces of the adversaries
became a large contributor to the effective utilisation of physical forces. The
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utilisation of moral forces, particularly courage, was a result of different
sources of courage. Allied military leaders ensured the United States 82d
and 101st Airborne Division were quickly relocated to the Ardennes. This
was a strategic move, not only as they were the reserves available for
Northwest Europe, but also because they had the ability to produce large
amounts of courage and positive morale due to their experience, training
and patriotism. The new German divisions were ineffectively utilised in the
endeavour to capture Bastogne, as their courage was formed purely from
patriotism, threats, and fear. Consequently, the United States veteran
division in Bastogne were able to utilise their moral forces against the
inexperienced German division until reinforcements arrived.
The utilisation of military leadership in the Ardennes Offensive had the
greatest effect on the result. This is evident from the initial planning stage
through to execution. German Führer, Adolf Hitler’s, total control affected
every aspect of the offensive, particularly his influence on his subordinates.
The German military leaders were unable to utilise their judgement and
intuition to secure a more realistic objective and strategies to achieve this.
However, the Fifth Panzer Armies commander, General Hasso von
Manteuffel demonstrated the most characteristics of Clausewitz’s concept of
a skilled commander by utilising his intuition and judgement to alter his
army’s route and tactics; interestingly his army made the most progress
during the offensive. Allied Forces had a much more effective command
structure, largely a result of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces,
General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s commitment to the Allied coalition.
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Eisenhower made numerous critical decisions during the offensive, the most
important being his movement of the major reserves to the Ardennes
following his intuitive though of the offensive being one of major
proportions. However, the December 20 command change permitting
British General, Bernard Montgomery command of all forces north of
Bastogne resulted in a delayed counteroffensive, allowing thousands of
German Forces to regroup for the final defense of the Third Reich. General
George S. Patton’s role as commander of the United States Third Army was
essential to success in the offensive. His skilled judgement and
determination in relieving Bastogne and commitment to the Allied
counteroffensive prevented German Forces from regrouping and altering
their strategy.
The analysis of the 1944 Ardennes Offensive through the perspective of
Clausewitz’s theory on moral forces has provided an alternative explanation
for Allied success in the Ardennes due to the interaction of physical and
moral forces. The human element of warfare was chosen as the basis for the
analysis of the Ardennes offensive as it is ignored by most military theorists,
yet plays a large role in warfare. This thesis contributes to previous
examinations of the offensive, and application of Clausewitz’s concept of
moral forces. This theoretical perspective can also be applied to other
historical battles to provide an additional layer for analysis and a deeper
understanding of the psychological contribution to warfare.
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